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ABSTRACT 
Since the late 1990s both the public and the federal and provincial governments in Canada have 
paid increasing attention to the issue of public sector salaries due to the availability of public 
compensation information, the aging of senior government officials and adoption of new public 
management by the public sector. This study investigates the factors determining the 
compensation level of senior government officials, namely deputy ministers (DMs), in the 
provincial and the federal governments in Canada. The key factors of interest are cabinet 
minister salaries, private sector salaries and the presence of pay-for-performance schemes. Using 
descriptive and regression analysis, this study shows that political elements play an important 
role in DM salary determination. In particular, regression results indicate a close relationship 
between DM and ministerial salaries during the period between 2000 and 2010. The relationship 
between DM salary and pay-for-performance schemes shows that DM salary is positively related 
to the presence of aggressive pay-for-performance schemes. This study argues that the 
introduction of pay-for-performance schemes is consistent with the politicization of the salary 
determination process for senior government officials. DMs with better performance are awarded 
with higher salaries in exchange for reaching performance measures that politicians lay out in 
advance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Compensation for Senior Public Servants in Canada 
The issue of executive compensation in the private sector has been at the heart of public debates 
since the late 1990s. Exorbitant executive salaries, bonuses and other financial rewards have 
been discussed in the media (Otten, 2007). Interest in the issue has been maintained because 
CEO remuneration continued to increase even during the economic recession. For example, 
according to CBC News (2015), between the 2008 and 2013 the growth rate in the salary of the 
highest-paid Canadian CEOs was twice the growth rate in salaries of the average Canadian 
worker. 
 In addition to being more aware of corporate executive salaries, the general public is also 
paying attention to the remuneration of senior government officials. Salary disclosure by 
provincial governments has directed the public’s attention to executive pay in the public sector. 
Due to the Disclosure Acts implemented in some provinces, information on total compensation 
and/or details about individual compensation is readily available to the public. Since 1996, the 
government of Ontario has provided salary information of employees who are paid $100,000 or 
more per year, including the position and the ministry name (Ontario, 2014). In addition, the 
Vancouver Sun launched an online database of public sector pay in British Columbia 
(Vancouver Sun, 2015). Due to the availability of this database, the compensation of senior 
officials is often in the media. 
 It is not only the general public who is interested in compensation practices in the public 
sector. Governments have also been interested in this issue. Since the 1980s, governments 
around the world have adopted reforms – often under the title of New Public Management (NPM) 
– in an attempt to achieve better public sector management (Hood, 1995). This trend is a 
worldwide phenomenon, especially in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries (Binderkrantz & 
Christensen, 2012). 
 In Canada, accountability took on a more central role for reforms in both the federal and 
provincial governments, starting in the 1990s. This new emphasis led to reforms in policy 
development, program and service delivery, and report procedures (English & Lindquist, 1998). 
The reforms also identified the need to improve the quality of leadership among senior managers. 
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According to the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (Canada, 
1998), the hiring process is crucial to finding the best employees and salary is an important tool 
for hiring and retaining these individuals. 
 The compensation for senior positions in the Canadian public sector is an important topic 
for governments due to the aging of senior government officials. Compensation reviews by both 
federal and provincial governments pointed to the retirement of senior officials as a threat to the 
continuation of good government. The federal Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention 
and Compensation argued that the recruitment environment of the 2000s is very different from 
the environment of the 1970s and 1980s, when a labour surplus existed (Canada, 2000b). The 
Senior Officials’ Compensation Committee in 2005 in Alberta argued that 39 percent of deputy 
ministers (DMs) are eligible to retire in early 2008 (Alberta, 2005). In 2008, the government of 
British Columbia predicted that 51 percent of DMs will be qualified to retire within the next 
decade (British Columbia, 2008).  
 Government’s focus on senior official compensation has led to changes in compensation 
practices. For instance, the federal government’s report from the Advisory Committee on Senior 
Level Retention and Compensation (Canada, 1998) acknowledged the lower level of 
compensation for the executive group including executives (EXs) and DMs in comparison with 
their counterparts in the private sector. The report suggested gradual changes in the 
compensation structure, including an increase in the total compensation for senior government 
officials and an implementation of variable pay that is based on performance. In Alberta, the 
Senior Officials Compensation Ad Hoc Committee (Alberta, 2005) was formed to examine the 
level and the components of compensation of senior officials. The committee recommended an 
increase in base salary to provide compensation that would be competitive both with other 
provincial governments and the private sector. They also recommended a modification to 
performance evaluation to motivate better performances and differentiate excellent employees 
from mediocre employees. The government of Nova Scotia announced new salary levels and the 
introduction of new pay plans, after compensation consultants reviewed senior public servants’ 
compensation (Nova Scotia, 2007). 
 One of the widespread changes in compensation practices in the Canadian public sector is 
the introduction of pay-for-performance schemes. The Canadian federal government introduced 
the Performance Management Program in 1998 (Canada, 1998). The provincial governments 
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also have implemented performance pay systems beginning in the late 1990s. Ontario Public 
Service executives, including DMs, have been eligible for a performance-based compensation 
and an incentive award program since April 1, 1997 (Winter, 2012). Alberta adopted lump-sum 
performance payments in 1998 (Alberta, 1998). Nova Scotia introduced a performance-related 
component to its total compensation package in 2002 (Nova Scotia, 2002). Since 2006, a portion 
of deputy ministers’ salary in British Columbia is held back and released depending on 
performance (Knittelfelder, 2012). Newfoundland and Labrador implemented a preliminary 
performance management program for period between 2009 and 2013; however, it was not put in 
effect due to budget constraints (Antle, 2013). In aggregate, all of the provinces, with the 
exception of Manitoba and Prince Edward Island, currently have a performance pay component. 
 Even though Canadian governments have acknowledged the importance of retaining and 
hiring qualified senior officials, their salaries remain much lower than salaries for comparable 
positions in the private sector. According to studies on wage differentials between the public and 
private sectors in Canada, there is a public sector wage premium for females, federal government 
workers, and workers at the lower level of the public sector classification. This premium, 
however, is lower, or even negative, for those at the higher classification levels, namely senior 
officials (Mueller, 1998, 2002). In 2008, the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and 
Compensation demonstrated that the total compensation of a senior federal government official 
ranged between 45 percent and 60 percent of the total compensation of their private sector 
counterpart. This gap in compensation levels between the two sectors increases as senior officials 
are promoted to executive levels. The Committee further showed that these findings have been 
consistent since 1997 (Canada, 2008). The provincial governments have also examined the 
significant salary gap between executives in the private and public sectors. Gartner (2007) 
showed that in 2005 salaries of selected CEOs in the health care, agriculture and financial sectors 
are approximately ten times higher than salaries of DMs in the Health, Agriculture, and Finance 
ministries of the Alberta government. 
1.2. Salary Determination in the Public Sector 
This difference in executive compensation between the public and private sectors raises the 
question as to the factors that generate this difference. One reason might be the political nature of 
the public sector. While the private sector will typically consider profit maximization when 
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deciding executive compensation, the public sector has a very different set of objectives. In 
particular, the public sector faces political pressures that come from the need to secure the public 
budget from both taxpayers and other interest groups (Gunderson, 1979). These political 
pressures are channeled through elections (see Borjas, 1984; Matschke, 2003) and the political 
ideology of governments (see Jensen, Sum & Flynn, 2009; Pontusson, Rueda & Way, 2002) to 
the wage settings in the public sector. As a result, senior government officials would receive 
lower levels of compensation (Joskow, Rose & Wolfram, 1996). 
 Although political pressures are likely to play a key role in the determination of public 
sector compensation, private sector wages also contribute to the level of public compensation. 
These linkages result from the link between the two labour markets. Although rules of wage 
determination differ from the private to the public sectors, the two labour markets are related due 
to the significant proportion of public employment in the total working population (Perez & 
Sanchez, 2011) and the fact that public sector employees can and do move to the private sector. 
1.3. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the factors determining the compensation of DMs in the 
federal and provincial public sector. In particular, the factors of interest are the salary of CEOs in 
the private sector, the salary of politicians and the presence of pay-for-performance schemes, 
while controlling for economic and political conditions. To carry out the required analysis for 
this determination, the objectives of this thesis are to: (1) present descriptive data of 
compensation for senior government officials (namely, DMs) in both the federal and provincial 
governments; (2) examine whether the compensation of senior public servants is linked to 
political pressure and market forces; and (3) investigate the impact of pay-for-performance 
schemes on the compensation for senior public servants. 
1.4. Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on executive 
compensation in both the private and the public sector, as well as a theoretical model of DM 
salary determination. Chapter 3 presents the description of the data that is used in the next two 
chapters. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth examination of pay-for-performance schemes in the 
provincial and federal governments in Canada, and a descriptive analysis of DM salaries over the 
 5 
 
2000-2010 period in relation to cabinet minister salaries, private comparator salaries and the 
introduction of pay-for-performance. Chapter 5 further explores the relationship between DM 
salary and the three variables outlined above using regression analysis. Chapter 6 begins with 
summary of the study, followed by a discussion of the policy implication. Finally, the thesis 
closes by discussing the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the relevant literature on performance pay and its 
application to the public sector. The objectives of the literature review are as follows: (1) to 
investigate the relationship between pay and performance by looking at agency theory; (2) to 
examine the application of pay-for-performance to both private and public sectors; and (3) to 
introduce a theoretical model for the determination of deputy minister salary. 
2.2. Pay-for-Performance and Agency Theory 
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory starts from the basic relationship between a principal and an agent. The agency 
relationship occurs when the principal gives the agent a task and the authority to make decisions 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a consequence, the agent takes an action on behalf of the 
principal. This action has an impact on both the principal and the agent (Miller, 2005). 
The agency relationship can be found in many situations. Examples of this relationship 
can be found between a potential home buyer/seller and a realtor agent, or a car insurer and a 
driver. In the corporate world, the relationship is between the shareholders and the manager/CEO. 
In this case, the shareholders (the principal), who hold the ownership of the firm, delegate 
control over the firm’s performance to manager/CEO (the agent). In the public sector, the agency 
relationship could occur between two different hierarchical positions (i.e., a superior as the 
principal and a subordinate as the agent), or between a politician who has supervisory power and 
a government department/agency (Dixit, 2002). 
The agency relationship suffers from the two problems. First, there is a conflict between 
the principal’s objectives and agent’s objectives because of the different interests of each party 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, shareholders want to maximize the firm’s profit whereas the 
manager/CEO wants to maximize his/her own personal benefit (which, in addition to 
compensation, may include power, prestige and perquisites). Second, there is an information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent that can only be observed at a cost (Eisenhardt, 
1989). More specifically, the agent has more information about the task being undertaken than 
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does the principal. For example, because a realtor is more knowledgeable about the housing 
market, the realtor could misrepresent housing information in such a way that could benefit the 
realtor but not the potential home buyer/seller. Because of these two reasons, the agent’s action 
may depart from the action that would maximize the principal’s interest. This departure is the 
agency problem. 
The main focus of agency theory is how to address these problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
There are two approaches by which the principal can address the problem: (1) monitoring the 
agent’s activity; and (2) providing proper incentives to the agent to do something desirable for 
the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Monitoring the agent’s activity is feasible when 
accurate information on the agent’s action is available. If the principal could learn the agent’s 
action, or if the outcome is tightly linked to the agent’s action, the principal could offer a 
contract based on the action. However, the direct observation of the action is typically difficult 
and the principal has difficulty verifying the agent’s action (Eisenhardt, 1989). Under these 
conditions, rather than introduce constant and expensive supervision, the principal introduces a 
contract with incentives for the agent to perform appropriately (Miller, 2005). Thus, the second 
approach to the agency problem is offering an outcome-based incentive. 
The starting point for the second approach is the outcome observed by the principal. 
Following Dixit (2002), the final outcome of the agent’s actions is determined by the agent’s 
direct action along with a random component. In other words, a verifiable random outcome x is 
the sum of an agent’s action a that is not verifiable and a normally distributed error ε with 
variance v. Thus, output can be written as: 
(1)  𝑥 = 𝑎 + 𝜀. 
Although the outcome is not a direct measure of the agent’s action, it can be used to infer the 
agent’s action to a certain degree and thus can form the basis of a contract between the principal 
and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 Assuming that the contract entails a simple linear payment schedule, the total 
compensation 𝑦(𝑥) can be expressed as the sum of a base salary k and a marginal reward per unit 
of x produced, mx, that is: 
(2)  𝑦(𝑥) = 𝑘 + 𝑚𝑥. 
The principal wants to design an outcome based incentive scheme that maximizes his expected 
utility. The expected utility for the principal is defined as the outcome x minus the cost of hiring 
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the agent. In maximizing utility, the principal needs to satisfy two constraints: (1) the 
participation constraint; and (2) the incentive constraint. To assure the agent’s participation, the 
principal must offer the agent an expected utility that is high enough for the agent to forgo 
alternatives. This ensures that the agent stays in the contract. Also, the principal must recognize 
how the payment scheme affects the agent’s action and take the induced action into consideration. 
This makes sure that the agent acts on behalf of the principal’s interests (Dixit, 2002). 
The payment schedule in equation (2) contains elements that address these two 
constraints. The base salary k is used to satisfy the participation constraint, while the coefficient 
m is chosen with knowledge of how the agent will react to the value of m chosen. 
Assuming the cost function of the agent’s action 𝐶(𝑎) = 1 2⁄ 𝑐𝑎
2  and the principal and 
the agent have risk aversion coefficients R and r respectively, the optimal marginal bonus 
coefficient is (Dixit, 2002): 
(3)  𝑚 =
1+𝑅𝑐𝑣
1+(𝑟+𝑅)𝑐𝑣
. 
The coefficient m determines the power of the incentives, with a larger m corresponding to a 
more high-powered incentive. As equation (3) indicates, the contract becomes more high-
powered as the measurement uncertainty decreases. For instance, if 𝑣 = 0 (which means the 
outcome that the principal observes from the agent’s action perfectly reflects the agent’s efforts, 
thus 𝑥 = 𝑎), m becomes 1. As v becomes large (which means the outcome is affected by other 
factors and less dependent on the agent’s efforts) m becomes smaller and the incentives are less 
high-powered (Dixit, 2002). 
The degree of risk aversion of each party also affects the power of the incentives. If both 
𝑅 = 0 and 𝑟 = 0 (i.e., the principal and the agent are both risk neutral), m equals 1. As r 
becomes larger (which means that the agent is more risk averse), the contract becomes less high-
powered. In contrast, the higher is R (which means that the principal is more risk averse), the 
more high-powered is the contract (Dixit, 2002). 
2.2.2. Application to the Private Sector 
The results of the model presented above have been used to examine executive compensation in 
the private sector. In particular, researchers have examined how sensitive the relationship is 
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between pay and firm performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In the context of the model 
presented above, the key question concerns the magnitude of m. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) measured the pay-performance sensitivity by running a least-
square regression between the CEO’s total compensation (dependent variable) and shareholder 
wealth (independent variable). The data is from 1974 to 1986. The coefficient b represents the 
pay-performance sensitivity, with a higher coefficient indicating more high-powered incentives. 
The estimated coefficient on shareholder wealth was 𝑏 = 0.000135 and statistically significant. 
This means that a $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth results in a 1.35 cent increase in the 
salary of the manager. Jensen and Murphy also recognized that other variables are associated 
with the firm performance, such as salary revision and stock ownership. The estimated 
coefficient of that captured all these impacts was a $3.25 change in the CEO’s salary as a result 
of a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. They concluded that although pay and performance 
are positively related and statistically significant, the value of the coefficient is lower than 
expected from the theory (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
 Murphy (1999) further investigated pay-performance sensitivity with data collected for 
the period 1992 to 1996. He showed that the proportion of stock options and stock ownership to 
the total compensation was the largest in the early 1990s, indicating that pay-performance 
sensitivity had increased. In fact, the sensitivity was nearly twice as large, increasing from 0.3 
percent for the period from 1970 to 1988 (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) to 0.6 percent for the period 
from 1992 to 1996 (Murphy, 1999). Nevertheless, Murphy pointed out that the interests of the 
executives are still not efficiently aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
 Some argue that the empirical results reporting low pay-performance sensitivities need to 
be revisited. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart and Carpenter (2010) contended that what constitutes the 
relationship between pay and shareholder wealth is important when re-investigating existing 
evidence. Murphy (1999) distinguished the implicit relationship from the explicit relationship. 
There is an implicit linkage between CEO wealth and stock-price performance via accounting 
based measures such as bonuses, salary adjustments, target bonuses and stock grant sizes. The 
explicit relationship between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth comes from CEO’s holdings of 
stock, restricted stock and stock options (Murphy, 1999). Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart and Carpenter 
(2010) found that many existing empirical studies focused on testing the implicit relationship. 
Viewing CEOs as investors of firms, they defined CEO wealth as both accounting measures and 
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stock options. By including shareholder returns in CEO wealth equation, the result of their 
analysis showed high pay-performance sensitivity. 
 Although some researchers argue that the relationship between shareholder wealth and 
CEO compensation needs to be redefined, others argue that there are other contributing factors to 
CEO compensation that need to be investigated. Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) 
argued that the empirical result of low pay-performance sensitivity might be due to the narrow 
range of performance criteria. In executive compensation studies, archival data sets have been 
used to run quantitative analyses. Also, those studies chose variables that can be quantified. Yet, 
these variables might only cover part of performance criteria. Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-
Mejia (2000) argued that the low sensitivity might be because of an incorrect methodology in 
research design, rather than because of a wrong prediction of the agency theory. 
In addition to the possible flaws in the design and methodology of the studies on 
executive compensation, it is argued that the optimal contract approach has limitations. The 
optimal contract approach starts with the presumption that offering the proper compensation 
scheme can solve the agency problem. The assumption in this approach is that boards will 
provide compensation schemes with appropriate incentives for managers to maximize 
shareholder utility. However, the board of directors could also be susceptible to an agency 
problem, meaning that its ability to design and offer an efficient incentive scheme is affected by 
board members’ interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  
The empirical inconsistencies in the pay-performance relationship and limitations of the 
optimal contract approach have led to another perspective on the agency relationship. This 
alternative approach, the managerial power approach, views the CEO compensation scheme as 
not only a possible tool to address the agency problem but also a part of the agency problem.  
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) examined the role played by the board of directors. For 
instance, directors may wish to stay in their positions and to be reappointed to the board, because 
they receive generous salaries and achieve reputations from networking opportunities. Since the 
CEO has the ability to influence the nomination process of directors and the compensation 
decision of directors, directors’ interests might be aligned with the CEO’s interests and not with 
the shareholders’ interests. Therefore, the managerial power approach contends that the 
executives have significant power over the compensation decision process through the directors. 
The higher managerial power implies that the CEO is able to arrange the compensation scheme 
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in the manager’s favour, thus allowing the CEO to benefit from the compensation arrangement 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
Although managerial power provides the manager with the ability to extract rents, the 
“outrage” expressed by the public puts a pressure on this behaviour. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
demonstrated that the perception of outsiders on executive compensation arrangements has an 
impact on the executive compensation decision process. For instance, if the public views large 
increases in compensation paid to the top manager as outrageous, this outrage could hurt the 
reputation of the directors and managers. Furthermore, shareholders will be reluctant to support 
the manager’s salary at this level. 
Due to the importance of the outrage effect on the executive compensation, the top 
managers are motivated to “hide” their rent extraction. For example, the top managers may hire a 
compensation consultant firm to generate a report that favours their high level of compensation. 
This report is used as a benchmark when the board decides how much to reward the top 
managers. Usually, the board remunerates the top manager at level higher than other top 
managers in the comparison group. 
2.2.3. Application to the Public Sector 
The focus on the relationship between pay and performance has influenced executive 
compensation in both the private and public sector. Since the 1980s, there have been reforms in 
the public sector in many developed countries (Hood, 1995). The view of NPM is that 
organizations consist of a series of agency relationship. Thus, one of the strategies for reform 
was to implement pay policies where performance is linked to pay (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009; 
Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2012). The rationale behind this strategy is similar to what has been 
seen in executive compensation in the private sector. That is, if a clear connection between 
organizational goals and top manager’s pay is determined, the top managers will have an 
incentive to pursue better performance (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2012). 
Performance related pay is often seen in the public sector (Ingraham, 1993). Many 
developed countries have implemented pay-for-performance systems in the public sector. Nearly 
two thirds of OECD members, including Canada, have introduced or are in the process of 
introducing the system (OECD, 2005). The federal government of Canada adopted the pay-for-
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performance system in 1981, with many provincial governments following suit since the late 
1990s. 
Despite the widespread introduction of pay-for-performance systems in the public sector, 
scholars argue that they have been not successful. One reason for the lack of success is due to the 
characteristics of the public sector: multiple principals, multiple tasks, and intrinsic motivation.  
First, government agencies in general have multiple principals. A key reason for multiple 
principals is due to the characteristics of public good. Once a public good has been produced, no 
one can prevent other people from consuming the public good (non-excludability) and an 
additional consumer need not pay for consumption of the good (non-rival). In other cases, public 
goods may be beneficial for some people and costly for others. Taken together, the result is that 
multiple objectives – multiple principals – have to be addressed. Furthermore, people in general 
wish to influence not only the nature of the final product but also how the product is produced. 
This makes it difficult to distinguish between actions and outcomes. Due to the different interests 
that are affected by the public service, it is unlikely that it will be able to produce “a single 
evaluation function” (Dixit, 2002, p. 712). One of the consequences of multiple principals is that 
the optimal incentive contract is likely to be low powered; thus, if a relatively high-powered 
incentive contract is introduced, the result could be poor outcomes (Dixit, 2002).  
Along with the multiple principals, many government agents face multiple tasks. For 
instance, suppose a government agency is in charge of mail delivery service. Although this 
service may sound relatively simple, it involves multiple tasks at different dimensions, including 
pricing the service, maintaining facilities, distributing proper delivery times, and so on. Due to 
multiple tasks, public agencies sometimes are given vague goals in multiple dimensions resulting 
in an inability to comprehend what they need to deliver. As well, incentives in these cases should 
be relatively low-powered; as discussed above, the introduction of relatively high-powered 
incentives can be detrimental to performance (Dixit, 2002).  
The Key assumptions of agency theory is that actions are not verifiable actions, while 
outcomes are verifiable. Wilson (1986) categorized different types of organizations depending on 
the observability of outcomes and actions. While there are organizations where actions are 
unverifiable and outcomes are verifiable, there are other organizations in the opposite situation. 
There are also organizations in which neither action or outcome is verifiable. Such a possibility 
corresponds to a situation where the variance v is very large. In these cases, the optimal contract 
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should be very low powered (Dixit, 2002); the failure to recognize the need for a low-powered 
contract can result in poor performance.  
Agents in the public sector also have their own motivation to work hard. Dixit (1997) 
contended that the motivation can be found in the service the agents provide, such as service to 
the poor, the old or the disabled. This service brings out the agents’ compassion and thus the 
agents perform without being offered high levels of monetary rewards. Wilson (1989) also 
argued that this motivation to work hard for an organizational mission is important in 
understanding the behaviour of public sector employees. The motivation can stem from a sense 
of an ethical responsibility, a desire to gain acknowledgement or personal power, or a benefit 
from being a part of an organization that society considers important. Thus, the agency in the 
public sector would need fewer financial rewards than agents in the private sector.  
In addition to the difficulties in applying the theory of incentives in the public sector, 
there are three reasons why the implementation of pay-for-performance system in the public 
sector is difficult: strict performance appraisal system, information asymmetry and budget 
constraints.  
Performance appraisal requires manager’s “flexibility and autonomy” (Ingraham, 1993, 
p.351). Dixit (2002) showed that subjective evaluation becomes an important component in 
evaluation scheme when agents face multiple actions and multiple outcomes. The agents may 
exert different types of efforts that produce multiple outcomes. Some outcomes could be 
observable but others may not. The incentive scheme that puts the emphasis on observable 
performance measures encourages the agents to focus on meeting observable targets but 
disregard unobservable targets. Hence, subjective performance appraisal, even if biased, is 
necessary so that the principals take all aspects of the agents’ action into consideration (Dixit, 
2002).  
However, in practice, the evaluation of performance in the public sector requires 
“standardization and objectivity” (Ingraham, 1993, p.351). The performance appraisal system is 
thus less flexible and heavily based on quantifiable measurements. While this structured and 
precise performance evaluation may appear to be fair and legitimate to the agents and/or some 
constituents, it may reduce the manager’s autonomy and flexibility when evaluating their agents 
(Ingraham, 1993); this in turn can negatively affect performance.  
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Second, the information related to performance appraisal is open to manipulation. 
Intrinsically, the subordinate has more information on his performance than does the manager. 
Subordinate could provide positive information but hide negative information when evaluating 
their performance; the information asymmetry makes it difficult for managers to evaluate 
performance.  
Third, budget constraints exist in the public sector. The source of compensation in the 
public sector is from taxes so the public sector is wary of how and where the resources are used 
(Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009). This tension is heightened during economic downturns, when 
politicians receive public outcrys and need to defend their decision on public sector 
compensation if rewarding public servants becomes an issue. Moreover, public agencies do not 
have control over their resources and the availability of the money for pay-for-performance 
systems is not always guaranteed (Ingraham, 1993).  
Government agencies also suffer from lack of competition. In the private sector, 
competition among firms generates strong external incentives to pursue profit maximization. 
However, many government agencies are effectively monopolies, since public goods, one of the 
key outputs of government, rarely have substitutes. One of the consequences of this lack of 
competition is poor quality and lack of attention to consumer preferences (Dixit, 2002). 
 
2.3. A Model of Deputy Minister Compensation 
The discussion above suggests that DM compensation is function of numerous factors, including 
the compensation in the private sector and political factors that are at work in the public sector. 
The purpose of this section is to outline the elements of a model developed by Atkinson, Fulton 
and Kim (2014) that brings these various factors together in a political-economic model of DM 
compensation determination. 
In the model, DM compensation is based on the interaction between supply and demand 
factors. On the supply side, professionals with appropriate background and training are assumed 
to make a decision to work in either the public or the private sector. While the private sector 
provides greater compensation, the public sector provides the opportunity to earn what Besley 
and Ghatak (2003) term “mission rents.” Assuming that professionals differ in the weight they 
attach to mission rents, the supply of public sector executives (i.e., those professionals that join 
the public sector) will be determined by those with a greater preference for higher mission rents 
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joining the public sector, while those with a lower preference will join the private sector. For a 
given compensation level in the private sector, the public sector can attract additional 
professionals by raising public sector compensation. 
The demand side of DM compensation consists of cabinet ministers who determine the 
number of DMs to hire and the level of DM compensation. The willingness of cabinet ministers 
to pay DMs is determined by two factors. First, from an economic perspective, the willingness to 
pay is a function the value of the marginal product of DMs. The value that DMs provide for 
cabinet ministers is offering policy advice, and developing and implementing policy. Second, 
from a political perspective, cabinet ministers’ willingness to pay will be a function of their own 
compensation level and the pressure, or outrage, that they receive from voters. When cabinet 
ministers review DM compensation, it is hypothesized that they use their own compensation as a 
benchmark since this value is available and familiar to them.  
As a result, the DM compensation is “pulled” toward cabinet minister compensation level. 
If DM salaries have historically been above those of cabinet ministers (which, as will be shown 
in the next chapter, has been true), this “pull” takes the form of DM salaries increasing much 
more slowly than those of cabinet ministers. The degree of this “pull” comes from the cabinet 
ministers’ perspectives on the DMs’ job description. If cabinet ministers view DMs’ work as 
similar to their own, it might be hard to accept that DMs should be paid as much as private sector 
executives (and even more than what they get). Similarly, if cabinet ministers regard themselves 
as being as powerful as DMs, they would want compensation levels also to be similar. In 
addition, since cabinet ministers hold elected positions, they are wary of the public outrage that 
might occur if the level of DM compensation is increased too much. Thus, the political forces 
result in a DM compensation level that is restricted as some multiple of cabinet minister 
compensation (Atkinson, Fulton & Kim, 2014). 
The equilibrium level of DM compensation is determined by the interaction of these 
supply and demand forces. The relative importance of these factors can be expected to differ 
over time and across jurisdictions. Thus, DM remuneration levels can be expected to be pulled 
more towards that the cabinet minister remuneration levels at points in time when political forces 
are significant (Atkinson, Fulton & Kim, 2014). 
The role of mission rents in this model is also important, since it is the presence of this 
rent that allows DM compensation to be significantly lower than for similar jobs in the private 
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sector. Thus, the existence of mission rents allows the political factors to play a role in the 
determination of DM compensation; without these rents, compensation levels would have to 
equalize in order to attract professionals to the public sector (Atkinson, Fulton & Kim, 2014). 
The model of DM compensation sketched out above suggests an important role for pay-
for-performance schemes. Without pay-for-performance, the level of compensation for all DMs 
is identical based on the assumption that there is no price discrimination. However, cabinet 
ministers are aware that individual DMs have different performance levels and are willing to 
offer more compensation for DMs who produce more value in their job. Pay-for-performance 
provides cabinet ministers with the ability to price discriminate and offer the higher performing 
DMs greater compensation (Atkinson, Fulton & Kim, 2014). 
The cabinet ministers’ ability to differentiate DM’s performances can also be interpreted 
through a political perspective. The pay-for-performance schemes are a mechanism by which 
DMs can be more closely connected to the government’s political agenda. Since cabinet 
ministers bear the political costs arising from the implementation of pay-for-performance 
schemes and the higher payments they imply, these schemes allow cabinet ministers to impose a 
political agenda on their DMs in the form of performance targets. The DMs who meet these 
goals now share the same fate as their political masters. Thus, pay-for-performance schemes can 
change DM salary levels, providing higher compensation to those DMs that support a political 
agenda, 
2.4. Summary 
The agency framework outlines the relationship between a principal and an agent and a link 
between pay and performance. While theory suggests a clear link between performance and pay, 
the empirical analysis of this relationship in the private sector shows mixed results. The 
application of agency theory to the public sector pays particular attention to important 
characteristics of the public sector such as multiple principals, multiple objectives, and political 
influence. Based upon the agency framework, a theoretical model of DM salary determination is 
developed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
3.1. Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the data on public sector compensation in Canada. More 
specifically, the chapter will present the data on DM, cabinet minister, and private sector 
compensation in Canada. The chapter will include a discussion of where the data was collected 
from, how the data is standardized and how the data is coded. Finally, this chapter will also 
present the data on the control variables. 
3.2. Public Sector Compensation Data in Canada 
3.2.1. Data Sources 
The key variables of the analysis are the salaries of DMs, cabinet ministers, and the DMs’ private 
sector counterparts over the period 2000-2010 for nine jurisdictions: British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and the federal 
government. In addition, data is required on the pay-for-performance policies of these provinces 
and the federal government. The source of this data is as follows. 
Data on individual DM salary salaries are collected from the Public Accounts of British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia and publications of Ontario’s 
Public Sector Salary Disclosure. Where no individual DM salary data is available (that is, 
Quebec and the federal government), the annual salary ranges of the DM salary are collected. 
The government of Quebec publishes their DM salary ranges annually in the Public Accounts, 
while the federal government data can be found in the reports of the Advisory Committee on 
Senior Level Retention and Compensation. The government of New Brunswick published 
individual DM salaries from 2000 to 2008 and individual DM salary ranges from 2009 to 2010 in 
their Public Accounts. Table 3.1 below shows the data sources in detail. 
Minister salaries are collected from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide Editions in 1995-
1997, 1998/99, 2000-2002, 2005, 2008-2010 for the federal government and the governments of 
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. The 
minister salaries in New Brunswick are collected from the Public Accounts from 2000 to 2010. 
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Table 3.1. DM Salary Data Source 
Jurisdiction Data Source 
FD Reports on Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (See: 
Canada, 2015) 
BC Public Accounts 2000-2010 (See: British Columbia, 2015) 
AB Public Accounts 2000-2010 (See: Alberta, 2015) 
SK Public Accounts 2000-2010 (See: Saskatchewan, 2011) 
MB Public Accounts 2000-2005 (See: Manitoba, 2001, 2003, 2005) 
Public Accounts 2006-2010 (See: Manitoba, 2015) 
ON Public Sector Salary Disclosure (See: Ontario, 2014) 
QC Public Accounts 2000-2010 (See: Quebec, 2015) 
NS Public Accounts 2000-2010 (See: Nova Scotia, 2015) 
NB Individual DM Salary: Public Accounts 2000-2008 
(See: New Brunswick, 2015) 
Individual DM Salary Range: Public Accounts 2008-2010 
(See: New Brunswick, 2015) 
 
Due to limited data availability, two jurisdictions are not included in this study: 
Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. The government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador provides DM salary salaries in the annual budget since 2012 under departmental salary 
details (see: Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013; Newfoundland and Labrador, 2012). The 
minister salaries in Newfoundland and Labrador are available after 2009 (see: Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 2015). The government of Prince Edward Island does not provide information on 
DM salaries. Data on minister salaries is available on the website of the Legislative Assembly of 
Prince Edward Island since 2005 (see: Prince Edward Island, 2014). 
Salaries of the DMs’ counterparts in the private sector are from the reports of the 
Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. This data is provided on a 
sporadic basis and is presented in graphs or figures (see Canada, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008, 
2011); as a result, estimates of the salaries were obtained by reading off the graphs and figures. 
Data for the missing years were interpolated from the data that was collected using the 
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Table 3.2. Pay-for-Performance: Introduction and Data Source 
Jurisdiction Pay-for-Performance  Source  
FD Implemented in 1981 See: Canada, 1998 
BC Implemented in 2006 See: Knittelfelder, 2012 
AB Implemented in 1998 See: Alberta, 2005 
SK Implemented in at least in 1987 See: Costescu, 2012 
MB No Pay-for-performance See: Cole, 2012 
ON Implemented in 1997 See: Winter, 2012 
QC Implemented in at least in 1983 See: Carter, 2013 
NS Implemented in 2002 See: Nova Scotia, 2002 
NB Implemented in 2008 See: McCracken, 2012 
 
assumption of a linear trend between data points. The private sector comparator salaries are 
available only at the federal level; it was assumed that this value also applied to each of the 
provinces. 
Information on the pay-for-performance policy policies in the various governments was 
obtained from government documents and from personal communication with government 
officials. Table 3.2 below shows detailed information on the year when different jurisdictions 
implemented their pay-for-performance schemes and on the source of the information. 
3.2.2. Data Standardization 
Since each government has different rules on public salary disclosure, the salary information for 
DMs and ministers often differed. In addition, the salaries for the private counterpart are only 
available for some years. To allow a comparison across jurisdictions and over time, it was 
necessary to standardize the data. This section will outline the procedure used to standardize the 
DM salary, cabinet minister salary and private-sector counterpart salary. 
The most diverse salary information was for DMs. DM salary data can be categorized 
into two broad categories: (1) individual salary amounts; and (2) individual/collective salary 
range. There are also different ways that the individual DM salaries are presented among 
jurisdictions: (a) the governments of Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario disclose an annual salary of 
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the DM in a ministry; (b) the government of British Columbia reports annual salaries of DMs 
and ADMs (Assistant DMs) without further disclosure of who served as DM or ADM; and (c) 
finally, some governments such as Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia publish the salaries of public 
employees (by ministry) who earn more than a threshold level. 
 Because these different procedures provide different salary information, data 
standardization is necessary. In the case of (a) above, the data shows how much a DM in a 
ministry is paid for a year. In the case of (b) more investigation is required to determine who 
served as DM. Similarly, in the case of (c) information on who served as DM needs to be 
acquired in order to match DMs and their salaries. In both examples (b) and (c), the Orders In 
Councils which announced DM appointments were used to identify DMs. Once data on the 
annual salaries of the DMs were collected, a comparison between the median and the mean DM 
salary was carried out. Since there were outliers in the DM salary levels in each jurisdiction, the 
median DM salary in each year was selected to represent the central tendency of annual DM 
salary in each government.  
 In three jurisdictions (New Brunswick from 2008 to 2010, Quebec and the federal 
government), DM salary ranges are published – these ranges extend from the minimum pay for 
the position to the maximum compensation level allowed. Since each jurisdiction has different 
rules and methods to publish the salary ranges, each jurisdiction is looked at separately to obtain 
reliable estimates of annual DM salaries. Regardless of the procedure that is used, there is always 
the possibility of biasing the estimate, since the distribution of DM salaries is unknown (e.g., 
there could be clustering at the low end or the high end, or individual salaries could be relatively 
evenly distributed).  
For New Brunswick, the government publishes the pay grid that individual DMs are 
located on. The mid points of each individual DM salary range are taken and then the median 
level of these midpoints is selected to represent the estimate of annual DM salary for New 
Brunswick for the period 2008 to 2010. 
 The government of Quebec also publishes the salary ranges of senior civil servants in the 
public accounts annually. According to the public accounts, senior civil servants include DMs, 
chief executive officers of government agencies, persons designated by the National Assembly 
and their assistants. Since collective salary ranges for senior civil servants contain a broad range 
of public employees, other information that could narrow the DM salary range down was 
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obtained. According to decree 713-2000, the DM salary ranges from $104,321 to $162,946, 
whereas salaries of senior civil servants range from $54,154 to $162,946 (for the year 2000). By 
comparing the public account in 2000 and decree 713-2000, the DM salary is located between 
the 50 percentile and the 100 percentile of the senior civil servants salary range. Unfortunately, 
there is no other document or decree showing only the DM salary range for the other years in this 
study. Therefore, it is assumed that the DM salary is between the midpoint and the maximum 
amount of the senior civil servants throughout all years. After collecting the DM salary ranges 
for each year, the mid-point of the DM salary ranges is taken as the estimate of annual DM 
salary. 
The DM salary ranges in the federal government are found in the reports of the Advisory 
Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. DMs in the federal government are 
divided into four levels; DM1 is the lowest and DM 4 is the highest. The Advisory Committee 
reports provide salary ranges for each level. As can be seen table 3.3 page, each level has 
different salary ranges and at risk pay. 
Three steps were used to obtain an estimate of annual DM salary. First, the DM 2 level is 
chosen among the four DM level because the private comparator values used in this study are 
also from the Advisory Committee reports and are benchmarked at the DM2 level. Second, the 
midpoint of the salary ranges for DM 2 is selected. The DM 2 salary ranges between the job rate, 
the maximum salary amount, and its 85 percent, the minimum salary amount. Third, the lump 
sum payment is added to the midpoint of the DM2 salary range. According to the report by 
Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, when the private market 
salary and the DM salary are compared, the DM salary was calculated as the job rate of DM2 
and 70 percent of the lump sum payment. Hence, it is assumed that the 70 percent of DM2s 
receive the full amount of available risk payment. 
Minister salaries represent the total salary of ministers with portfolio each year. The 
salaries consist of the basic salary for being Members of the Legislative Assembly (or Members 
of Parliament) and the additional salary of being a cabinet minister. 
Estimates of the comparable salaries in the private sector are obtained from the graphs in 
the reports by the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. There are 
three problems concerning the private counterpart salaries. First, the exact level of salary is not 
available. Second, the counterpart salary information contains some other components that are 
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not included in the DMs’ and ministers’ salaries. Third, the counterpart salary is only available 
for six selected years. Fourth, the counterpart salary at the provincial level is not available.  
To obtain estimates of private counterpart salary, four steps are used. First, the 
approximate level of comparator salary is obtained based upon a visual inspection of the graphs. 
Second, the private comparator salary data is adjusted to remove cash compensation, and pension 
and other benefits (the salary for DMs and ministers do not include pensions and other benefits). 
According to the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, pension  
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Table 3.3. DM Salary Job Rates and Lump Sum Pay in the Federal Government 
 
Job Rates (Salary range maximum)* and At-Risk Pay 
DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 
Year Job Rate At-Risk Pay** Job Rate At-Risk Pay Job Rate At-Risk Pay Job Rate At-Risk Pay 
2000 170,700 15% 196,300 20% 219,800 20% 246,300 25% 
2001 176,000 15% 202,400 20% 226,700 20% 254,000 25% 
2002 180,100 15% 207,100 20% 232,000 20% 259,000 25% 
2003 185,000 15% 212,900 20% 238,500 20% 267,200 25% 
2004 189,800 15% 218,200 20% 244,400 20% 273,800 25% 
2005 195,100 - 224,300 - 251,200 - 281,300 - 
2006 200,000 16.1% 230,000 21.1% 257,500 21.1% 288,400 26.1% 
2007 204,200 22.4% 234,900 27.4% 263,000 27.4% 294,500 32.4% 
2008 208,300 26% 239,600 33% 268,300 33% 300,400 39% 
2009 211,500 26% 243,200 33% 272,400 33% 305,000 39% 
2010 214,700 26% 246,900 33% 276,500 33% 309,600 39% 
* Minimum salary is at 85 percent of the job rate.  
** From 2000 to 2006, only at-risk pay exists. During this period, At-risk pay indicates the maximum at-risk pay. From 2007, 
performance pay includes at-risk pay and bonus. At-risk pay from 2007 indicates the maximum of both at-risk pay and bonus.  
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and other benefits account for 16 percent of the value of the Canadian labour market (Canada, 
2011). Thus, 16 percent is used in the adjustment of the comparator salary. Third, the estimated 
salary points for the years for which data is not available are obtained using linear interpolation 
between adjacent data points. Fourth, because counterpart salaries are not available at the 
provincial level, it is assumed that the private salary is the same for all jurisdictions. 
3.2.3. Data Coding 
The salary data obtained using the methodology outlined above is nominal data. To convert the 
data to constant dollars, the GDP price deflator was used. The result is real data expressed in 
2002 dollars. 
Data on the pay-for-performance scheme used in each jurisdiction is also required for the 
analysis. There are two different variables: Pay-for-performance and Pay-for-performance by 
type. The Pay-for-performance variable indicates whether the jurisdiction in question has a pay-
for-performance system in place. If there is pay-for-performance scheme, the variable takes on a 
value of 1; if not, the variable takes on a value of 0. For instance, the government of Nova Scotia 
implemented its pay-for-performance schemes in 2002. Because there was no pay-for-
performance scheme before 2002, the Pay-for-performance variable for 2000 and 2001 for Nova 
Scotia is coded as 0; for the rest of the years (i.e., from 2002 to 2010), this variable is coded as 1.  
The Pay-for-performance by type variable recognizes the different types of pay-for-
performance schemes that are in place. Although pay-for-performance schemes are common 
practice in the public sector, different jurisdictions have adopted different forms. In particular, 
pay-for-performance schemes differ in the amount of salary that is available as a bonus (or is at 
risk). This amount varies from the incremental increase within a salary range to over 20 percent 
of lump sum payment. Depending on how aggressive the form is, the pay-for-performance type 
is divided into (1) Aggressive, (2) Passive, and (3) No Pay-for-Performance. Each three 
categories are three dummy variables. For instance, the federal government has implemented the 
aggressive form of the pay-for-performance scheme whereas the government of Saskatchewan 
has a passive scheme. The next chapter provides a more detailed examination of the pay-for-
performance type. 
 
 25 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
There are two types of control variables included in the regression analysis: economic and 
political. Although it is expected that the salary setting environment in the public sector is 
influenced by political variables, the literature and empirical evidence show that the labour 
market environment also plays an important role in determining public sector salary. According 
to Fernandez-de-Cordaba, Perez and Torres (2012), the labour market condition is related to 
public salary determination. They further explained that governments tend to increase 
employment and salaries when the economic conditions are tight and do the opposite when the 
economy is in downturn. In addition, the Advisory Committee in Senior Level Retention and 
Compensation (Canada, 2010) indicated that following the labour market trend is essential to 
keep the public labour market competitive in order to hire and preserve high quality senior 
executives for the federal government. The government of British Columbia also has an 
objective of retaining its competitiveness by paying close attention to the Canadian labour 
market and economic conditions (British Columbia, 2010). 
In this study, three economic variables are selected, Inflation, Economic growth and GDP 
per capita. Inflation is measured by the change in the GDP implicit price index. It is expected 
that DM salary will be positively related to the rate of inflation, since as prices go up, increases 
in compensation will be required to maintain purchasing power. 
 Economic growth is measured by the year-to-year percentage change in expenditure 
based GDP in the economy of the jurisdiction in question. It is also adjusted for inflation in order 
to obtain a real growth rate. The growth rate ranged from -4 percent to 6 percent over the period 
2000 to 2010 and across the various jurisdictions. Since economic growth represents the health 
of the economy and a stronger economy can be expected to support DM salaries, it is expected 
that there will be a positive relationship between Economic growth and DM salary. 
 GDP per capita is calculated by dividing real GDP by population. It is expected that 
there will be a positive relationship between GDP per capita and DM compensation. For 
instance, Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2007) showed that the governments in the Euro area 
follow the trend of real GDP per capita when setting government expenditures on employee 
compensation. The unit of GDP per capita is 2002 dollars per person.  
 The existence of political barriers in the public sector can also influence the DM salary 
level. Political pressure is indirectly channeled through institutional settings, which in turn are 
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directly conducive to the public wage setting process (Gunderson, 1979). Three political control 
variables are selected for this study: Election, Political party and Unionization in the public 
sector.  
 The variable Election is a dummy variable that indicates whether an election was held in 
that year (Election = 1) or not (Election = 0). By its nature, government is a political entity that 
seeks political support from the voters. Governments often utilize their resources in an attempt to 
regain or retain political power (Borjas, 1984). The evidence suggested in the literature supports 
the general consensus that there is a relationship between the electoral cycle and the 
government’s spending pattern (Blais & Nadeau, 1992). Borjas (1984) studied the wages of 
federal public servants during election times in the United States and showed that the wage 
increased more during the election year than the non-election year. Matschke (2003) also showed 
that there was an increase in the public wage due to the electoral cycle in Germany. Thus, the 
variable Election is expected to have a positive relationship with DM salary. 
It is also expected that the nature of the governing political party plays a role. The 
political parties, whether right or left wing, have different political constituencies, which lead 
political parties to have different objectives and preferences on policy decisions. Jensen, Sum 
and Flynn (2009) showed that government employees agree with left wing parties’ ideas on the 
expansion of government (i.e., larger government expenditure). However, they also showed that 
employees with higher levels of income level are less likely to support the left wing party. 
Pontusson, Rueda and Way (2002) explained that liberal governments promote an egalitarian 
culture within the public sector, which in turn implies a relatively more equal income distribution 
among employees. Thus, left wing governments can be expected to push up the salary of the 
lower-end pay scale workers and constrain the salary of the higher-end pay scale workers. 
Therefore, left or centre leaning parties may be expected to exert a negative impact on DM salary 
salaries, while conservative parties would have the opposite impact. In this study, a variable 
Conservative is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for conservative/right-of-centre parties 
and 0 for centre or left parties. The information on political party and ideology is taken from the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) Fiscal Rules Database. Table 3.4 shows the categorization 
of a political party.  
A variable Unionization is calculated as the percentage of public sector workers who are 
covered by a union. In general, employees, whether in local or state governments and whether 
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covered or not covered by collective agreements, are likely to earn more when there is union in 
the public sector. Hence, the higher the degree of unionization in the public sector, the higher 
salary for both covered and not covered employees (Belman, Heywood & Lund, 1997). However, 
Pontusson, Rueda and Way (2002) explain that this relationship may not hold for senior civil 
servants. The reason is that the egalitarian culture and union density in the public sector promote 
a more equal income distribution among public employees. Since DMs are the highest paid 
employees in the public sector, it is expected that the degree of unionization in the public sector 
has a negative impact on DM salary. Table 3.5 provides detailed information on the control 
variables. The description of each variable and the source of data are explained. 
 
Table 3.4. Political Party and Political Ideology  
Jurisdiction Political Party Conservative 
FD Liberal party of the federal government Non Conservative 
Conservative party of the federal government 
 
Conservative 
BC NDP of British Columbia Non Conservative 
Liberal party of British Columbia 
 
Conservative 
AB Progressive Conservative party of Alberta 
 
Conservative 
SK NDP of Saskatchewan Non Conservative 
Saskatchewan Party 
 
Conservative 
MB NDP of Manitoba 
 
Non Conservative 
ON Conservative party of Ontario Conservative 
Liberal party of Ontario 
 
Non Conservative 
QC Parti Quebecois Non Conservative 
Liberal party of Quebec 
 
Conservative 
NS Conservative party of Nova Scotia Conservative 
NDP of Nova Scotia 
 
Non Conservative 
NB Progressive Conservative of New Brunswick Conservative 
Liberal party of New Brunswick  Non Conservative 
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3.4. Summary 
Chapter 3 described the data used in this study. First of all, this chapter introduced how the raw 
data of each variable is collected. The data on DM salary, cabinet minister salary and private 
counterpart salary are from various government documents (e.g., Public Accounts in some 
provincial governments; reports from the committee regarding compensation policy in other 
jurisdictions). The data on the pay-for-performance scheme in each jurisdiction are collected 
through either personal communication with government officials or government documents.  
 The next part of the chapter 3 presented how the quantitative variables are standardized 
and the categorical variables are coded for the regression analysis. The salaries of DM, cabinet 
minister and private counterpart are stated in constant 2002 dollars. The pay-for-performance 
system is expressed as the existence of the scheme in place, thus regarded as the categorical 
variable. Lastly, the economic and political control variables were introduced. The determination 
of DM salary involves other factors apart from the independent variables. Based on the literature 
and empirical studies, both market conditions and the political environment have an impact on 
public salary determination. The economic control variables - Inflation, Economic Growth, and 
GDP per capita – measure labour market conditions. The political control variables – Election, 
Political party, and Unionization – take into account the political pressure.
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Table 3.5. Control Variables: Description and Data Source 
Variables Description Data Source 
Inflation Implicit price indexes, gross domestic product 
(2002=100) 
 
Statistics Canada – Cansim Table No. 384-0036 
Economic growth Percentage change (year to year) of gross domestic 
product, expenditure-based (changed in 2002 dollars) 
 
Statistics Canada – Cansim Table No. 384-0002 
GDP per capita Real gross domestic product (2002=100) divided by 
estimates of population 
 
Statistics Canada – Cansim Table No. 384-0002 
Statistics Canada – Cansim Table No. 051-0005 
Election Year that an election is held  
(=1, if no election=0) 
 
PBO Fiscal Rules Database 
Conservative Ideology of a party  
(if Conservative=1, if no conservative=0) 
 
PBO Fiscal Rules Database 
Unionization Percentage of employees covered by union in total 
employees in the public sector 
Statistics Canada – Cansim Table No. 282-0078 
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CHAPTER 4 
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE AND DM COMPENSATION IN CANADA 
4.1. Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to: (1) examine pay-for-performance legislation in Canada’s 
provincial and federal governments and develop a categorization of the pay-for-performance 
schemes that have been introduced over the last 20 to 30 years; (2) provide a descriptive analysis 
of DM salary over the 2000-2010 period; and (3) show the relationship between DM salary and 
the compensation paid to cabinet ministers, the relationship between DM salary and the 
compensation paid in the private sector, and the relationship between DM salary and the 
introduction of pay-for-performance schemes.  
4.2. Pay-for-Performance in the Canadian Public Sector 
4.2.1. Pay-for-Performance Schemes 
Pay-for-performance schemes have been adopted in developed countries around the world, 
including Canada (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009). The early forms of performance related pay 
have existed since the 1980s. In Canada, the federal government introduced a performance pay 
system in 1981 (Canada, 1998). Quebec and Saskatchewan followed the federal government’s 
footsteps – Quebec introducing performance related pay as early as 1983 and Saskatchewan in 
1987. 
 Elsewhere in Canada, pay-for-performance schemes have been introduced beginning in 
the late 1990s. The government of Ontario introduced performance-based compensation and 
incentive award programs that targeted senior executives including DMs in April 1997 (Winter, 
2012). Alberta adopted lump sum performance payments in 1998 (Alberta, 1998), followed by 
Nova Scotia in 2002 (Nova Scotia, 2002), British Columbia in 2006 (Knittelfelder, 2012), and 
New Brunswick in 2008 (McCracken, 2012). Currently, all of the provinces, with the exception 
of Manitoba (Cole, 2012) and Prince Edward Island (Stanley, 2012), have a performance pay 
component in their total compensation for senior officials. Figure 4.1 provides a timeline of the 
introduction of pay-for-performance schemes in Canada.  
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Figure 4.1. Timeline for the Introduction of Pay-for-Performance Schemes in Canada 
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One reason for the adoption of pay-for-performance schemes is an attempt by government to 
adopt the practices of the private sector (Perry, Engbers & Jun, 2009). Pay-for-performance 
schemes have been introduced alongside the adoption of New Public Management, a 
management approach that transfers private business practices such as contracting and attention 
to the needs of the final consumer to the public sector with the intention of improving the 
efficiency of public service (OECD, 2005). Seen in this light, the adoption of pay-for-
performance schemes can be seen as an attempt by government to adopt practices that have been 
proven to be successful, albeit in a different environment, and hence are viewed as legitimate. 
This tendency to mimic the practices of other organization also involves other governments. For 
instance, the government of Nova Scotia introduced the performance components in order to be 
“in line with other provincial governments” (Nova Scotia, 2002). 
 Internally, performance systems are believed to bring improvements to management and 
the quality of public service. According to the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention 
and Compensation, the Performance Management Program reinforces organizational and 
individual accountability by rewarding achieved results and encouraging better performance 
(Canada, 2003). Also, the Advisory Committee states that the close relationship between a 
financial reward and an outstanding performance would eventually produce efficient and cost 
effective public service (Canada, 2000a). 
 Along with higher public service quality, the various jurisdictions in Canada believe that 
the pay-for-performance system will help attract and retain talented senior professionals. One of 
the conclusions reached by compensation reviews undertaken by the federal and provincial 
governments is that of an aging public service and the need to find a new pool of talented public 
servants. The Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (Canada, 2002) 
argued that the recruitment environment in the 2000s is different from the time when a labour 
surplus existed in 1970s and 1980s. In a similar vein, the Senior Officials Compensation Ad Hoc 
Committee (Alberta, 2005) in Alberta indicated that 39 percent of DMs were eligible to retire in 
early 2008, while the government of British Columbia predicted in 2008 that 51 percent of DMs 
would be qualified to retire within the next decade (British Columbia, 2008). The development 
of competitive compensation systems that reward those with the appropriate skills is an 
important element in attracting senior civil servants.  
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 Despite the governments’ commitment, the efficacy of the pay-for-performance system 
remains unclear. This question comes from the nature of public sector in terms of institutional 
settings and characteristic of public servants. When linking performance and pay, the public 
sector is often faced with difficulties of defining and measuring performance goals and targets. 
The government officials have multiple goals, which are often vague, and multiple principals 
whose interests are different. Thus, evaluation of performance is challenging. In addition, even if 
concise performance goals and evaluation are possible, governments face financial constraints. 
The result is that a governments’ desire to keep salary levels competitive compared to the private 
sector and maintain internal equity horizontally and vertically is incompatible with the limited 
budget. This incompatibility is more apparent when budgets are tight (Kellough & Lu, 1993). In 
fact, incentive pay plans are often frozen in economic downturns. For instance, an early form of 
performance management (between 1981 and 1998) in the federal government was suspended 
twice due to budgetary constraints (the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act in 1982-1983 
and the Budget Implementation Act in 1994-1996) (Canada, 1998). Recently, a number of 
provinces have suspended their performance systems due to economic downturns in the late 
2000s. For example, the Achievement Bonus in Alberta has been suspended since March 1, 2008, 
while the compensation structure in Ontario was frozen on March 25, 2010, and lasted until 
March 31, 2012 (Ontario, 2010). 
 Not only does the non-market setting of the public sector make the efficacy of pay-for-
performance difficult, so too does the motivation of public servants. Unlike the private sector 
where the agents are primarily attracted to monetary incentives, the agents in the public sector 
often have a motivation to serve the public. This inconsistency between the motivation and an 
attempt to link pay and performance results in reducing the efficacy of the pay-for-performance 
schemes (Langbein, 2010).  
 Even though evidence of successful pay-for-performance is rarely found (Burgess & 
Ratto, 2003; Kellough & Lu, 1993), the implementation of this scheme is prevalent in the public 
sector. Ingraham (2005) argued that despite the challenges of the performance pay system 
governments need to keep moving to this direction. Kellogh and Lu (1993) explained a number 
of reasons behind the “persistence” of performance pay. There are three reasons that could shed 
light in this study: first, linking pay and performance improves transparency and accountability; 
second, this linkage allows principals to have more control over their agents by participating in 
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the performance appraisal process; further to the second reason, the senior officials are more 
prone to political control by their masters. In next section, pay-for-performance systems in the 
Canadian governments will be looked at closely. 
4.2.2. Types of Pay-for-Performance Schemes 
As mentioned above, all jurisdictions in Canada except Manitoba and Prince Edward Island have  
adopted pay-for-performance schemes. Furthermore, there are significant variations in the form 
of the pay-for-performance schemes among the different governments. Three variations have 
been identified: (1) aggressive, (2) passive, and (3) resistant, or no pay-for-performance.  
 The basis for this categorization comes from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB), which provides an analysis of different types of pay-for-performance schemes. Pay-for-
performance schemes consist of a base salary and an “at risk” or bonus component. According to 
MSPB, there are three types of pay-for-performance: (1) a bonus or lump sum payment which is 
paid in addition to the annual base pay, (2) an incremental increase within salary range based on 
performance, and (3) a combination of the two (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 2006).  
In a number of jurisdictions in Canada, the “at risk” or lump sum component can be as 
high as 30 percent of base salary. The aggressive category is defined to include schemes that 
have fairly large bonus payments (Aggressive A), or a combination of bonus and salary 
progression within the salary range (Aggressive B). Among the Canadian governments, the 
federal government, British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario are deemed to have adopted the 
aggressive form of pay-for-performance. In contrast, the passive category includes a relatively 
small component of “at risk” pay. The passive performance systems typically involve an 
incremental increase in salary based on performance to the maximum of the salary range. The 
jurisdictions that are categorized as having the passive form are Saskatchewan, Quebec, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick.  
Table 4.1 provides a description of pay-for-performance schemes in the different 
jurisdictions in Canada, along with a categorization of these schemes according to the criteria 
laid out above. Although the pay-for-performance schemes are divided into three categories, 
each government shows unique characteristics in terms of payment arrangement, performance 
goals and appraisal and limitations on eligibility. For instance, Alberta, which is classified as 
Aggressive A, rewards a bonus to DMs who performed very well in a given year, while British 
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Columbia, which is also categorized as Aggressive A, introduced holdbacks that are only paid 
when DM meets criteria that are set in advance. The federal government, which is classified as 
Aggressive B, provides rewards in terms of salary adjustment as well as lump sum payment for 
those who meet expectations, allowing higher discrepancy in DM salaries In contrast, Ontario, 
which is also classified as Aggressive B, differentiates DMs who are within base salary range 
from those at maximum base salary range. The compensation of DMs within base salary range 
progresses until they reach the maximum level; DMs at the maximum range are rewarded with 
lump sum payments. 
 Performance goals and appraisal also vary among jurisdictions. In general, performance 
goals include organizational and individual targets. Organizational goals refer to targets at the 
ministry/department level, while individual goals refer to targets for management and leadership 
set out for the individual DM. While both organizational and individual goals are assessed during 
the appraisal process in most jurisdictions, different weights have been assigned to each goal in 
each government. 
 Lastly, there are various limitations on eligibility of pay-for-performance pay. Some 
provincial governments with a passive pay-for-performance scheme explicitly restrict further 
rewards for those who are at the maximum level of their salary range. In contrast, governments 
with aggressive schemes allow one-time lump sum payment regardless of DM’s salary amount.  
4.3. DM Compensation in Canada 
4.3.1. DM Compensation 
Figure 4.2 presents real DM salaries over the period 2000-2010 in nine jurisdictions (all salary 
figures are reported in 2002 dollars unless otherwise specified). There are four characteristics of 
DM salary during this period: (1) DM salaries have, on average, increased; (2) there is 
considerable year-to-year fluctuation in DM salaries for some jurisdictions; (3) jurisdictions 
often change their position within the overall ranking of DM salaries; and (4) there is a decrease 
in DM salaries in some jurisdictions after the 2008 economic crises.  
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Table 4.1. Categorization of Federal and Provincial Pay-for-Performance Schemes 
Jurisdiction Type of Scheme Detailed information 
AB Aggressive A 
Lump sum payment 
• Funding: Bonus pool established at 20% of DM payroll 
• Lump sum payment: 0-30% of annual salary (highest rating for exceptional 
performance) 
• Performance goals: government, ministry and individual/team goals – leadership 
development, work environment, collaboration with other ministries, and 
demonstration of innovation  
• Performance appraisal: individual performance against performance goals 
BC Aggressive A 
Lump sum payment 
• Lump sum payment: 10% of salary holdbacks  
• Performance goals: employee engagement, achievement of fiscal targets, delivery of 
key government priorities, preparation of the future of the public service  
• Performance appraisal: based on the achievement of goals and targets within ministry 
service plans and specific performance objectives 
FD 
 
Aggressive B 
Salary adjustment +  
lump sum payment 
• Salary adjustment: economic increase (% increase in base salary) + in-range salary 
movement (5% progression per year) for those achieving expectations 
• Lump sum payment: at-risk pay (re-earnable 0-30% of base salary) for those achieving 
expectations + bonus (0-9%) for those surpass expectations 
• Performance goals: individual goals (policy and program, management, and leadership 
results) + corporate goals 
• Performance appraisal: performance rating based on results achieved and on the 
manner in which they were achieved (5 ratings) 
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Table 4.1. Categorization of Federal and Provincial Pay-for-Performance Schemes (cont’d) 
Jurisdiction Type of Scheme Detailed information 
ON Aggressive B 
Salary adjustment + 
lump sum payment 
• Funding: availability in any given year subject to Cabinet approval 
• Salary adjustment: 0-20% of current base salary for those not at the salary range 
maximum 
• Lump sum payment: 0-20% of current base salary for those at the salary range 
maximum 
• Performance goals: corporate, ministry, and individual goals 
• Performance appraisal: based on achievement of business and operational plan 
commitments  
QC Passive 
Salary adjustment + 
lump sum payment 
• Salary adjustment: 0-10% of current base salary for those not at the salary range 
maximum 
• Lump sum payment: 0-10% of current base salary for those at the salary range 
maximum 
• Performance appraisal: deputies given grades A-E; A = results much exceed 
expectations, C = results equal expectations; E = results much less than expectations. 
Grades translate into salary adjustments 
SK Passive 
Salary adjustment  
• Funding: identified by Public Service Commission annually 
• Salary adjustment: Public Service Commission provides guidelines annually (i.e., 
maximum 3% of salary increase) 
• Performance goals: work, competency, and learning and development objectives 
• Performance appraisal: performance rating against goals (5 ratings) 
• Limitation: not eligible for those at the salary range maximum 
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Table 4.1. Categorization of Federal and Provincial Pay-for-Performance Schemes (cont’d) 
Jurisdiction Type of Scheme Detailed information 
NS Passive  
Salary adjustment 
• Salary adjustment: up to 110% of DM’s base pay rate (highest rating for exceptional 
performance for a number of years) 
• Limitation: not eligible for those not meeting or exceeding expectations/ negative 
salary adjustment for those at or not meeting expectation, and having been awarded a 
performance increase previously 
NB Passive 
Salary adjustment  
• Salary adjustment: merit increase 
• Performance goals: government commitments, corporate priorities, departmental 
challenges, horizontal management responsibilities 
• Performance appraisal: review of goals on DM’s anniversary date 
• Limitation: not eligible for those at the salary range maximum 
PEI Resistant   
MB Resistant  
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First, DM salaries have in general increased over time in real terms. Even though there 
are some hikes and setbacks in DM salary across Canada from time to time, real DM salaries 
have tended to trend upward over time. Over the period 2000-2010, all jurisdictions, except 
Manitoba, experience an increase in DM salary, although some of the increases have been very 
small (as in Ontario). 
Despite this overall increase, considerable fluctuations are observed in some provinces. 
The governments of British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
experience one or two hikes in DM salaries during the 2000-2010 period by more than 15 
percent. Coincidentally, some increases are linked with changes in the compensation policy. For 
instance, British Columbia (2006) increased their DMs salary to 83 percent of federal salary in 
2001, resulting in a 26.5 percent increase in DM salary between 2001 and 2002. In 2006, another 
adjustment in DM salary was implemented, in addition to the introduction of salary holdback 
based on performance, showing 21 percent increase in year 2005-2006. Furthermore, Nova 
Scotia underwent a change in the pay plan for senior officials effective in 2007, resulting in a pay 
increase for all DMs. In 2006, which was an interim year to a new pay system, there was a 
retroactive payment to the DMs, hence increasing the DM salary by 22.5 percent.  
Third, jurisdictions that are classified as having the highest DM salaries in 2000 do not 
always remain in that category in later years. For instance, in 2000, the highest DM salary group 
included the federal government, Alberta and Ontario. DMs in the federal government were paid 
approximately $217,000, followed by DMs in Alberta at $214,000 and DMs in Ontario at 
$192,000. DM pay in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was at the lowest level at approximately 
$102,000 in 2000, with the rest of the provinces—British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba 
and Quebec—clustered in the $128,000 to $136,000 range. By 2010, only Alberta remained in 
the highest DM salary group, paying their DMs around $283,000. The federal government lies 
between the highest and the midrange group, recording $230,000 for DM annual salary. Ontario 
fell back to the middle range group, which now consists of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, 
British Columbia, and Saskatchewan; salaries in this group range from $173,000 to $196,000. 
New Brunswick moved to the middle range group, paying their DMs around $189,000. In fact, 
New Brunswick records the highest annual growth rate of DM salary among all jurisdictions 
(6.69 percent annual growth rate between 2000 and 2010). The lowest DM salary group in 2010 
contains Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Nova Scotia remains in the lowest group, while Manitoba 
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moves from the middle range to the lowest group. The DM salary in Manitoba is $123,000 in 
2010, which is the lowest real DM salary among all the jurisdictions. 
Finally, many jurisdictions experience a decrease in real DM salary due to the economic 
downturn in the late 2000s. All jurisdictions except Quebec encounter a decrease in real DM 
salary after 2008. For instance, Alberta paid their DMs approximately $325,000 in 2008, the 
highest salary across Canada. In 2009, DMs in Alberta received on average $286,000, a 12 
percent decrease. This drop was due to the Government of Alberta suspending the bonus 
payments in 2008. Similar to Alberta, the government of Ontario in 2010 also announced salary 
range freezes on those who are not covered by the union (including their DMs) at 2009 levels 
(Winter, personal communication, May 3, 2012). DM salaries in Ontario in 2009 were 
approximately $213,000 in real terms; in 2010, the real DM salaries were around $195,000, a 
decrease of about 8 percent. British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick report over a five 
percent decrease in real DM salaries between 2009 and 2010. Although Quebec shows a 
continual increase in real DM salaries over time, between 2009 and 2010 the growth rate of DM 
salary fell to 0.5 percent, much less than the average annual growth rate over the previous 
periods. 
While the numbers presented above indicate that DM salaries have increased in real 
terms over the 2000-2010 period, they do not provide any comparison with salaries in the private 
sector, nor with salaries of their political masters – i.e., cabinet ministers. The next sub-section 
examines the salaries of cabinet ministers and compares them to the salaries of DMs. This 
analysis is then followed by an examination of salaries in the private sector. 
4.3.2. DM and Cabinet Minister Salaries 
Figure 4.3 presents real cabinet minister pay in the federal and provincial governments from 
2000 to 2010. As illustrated, cabinet minister salaries exhibited four features: (1) salaries 
increase at steady rate over time; (2) there are substantial hikes in minister salary for most 
governments; (3) some variations in overall ranking of minister salaries can be seen; (4) difficult 
economic conditions provide downward pressure on minister salary growth. 
First, minister salaries across Canada show a consistent increase over time. Compared to 
the DM salary trend, minister salaries show much less fluctuations. Instead, minister salary tends 
to increase at a steady rate, albeit with abrupt hikes in some jurisdictions. 
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Figure 4.2 Real DM Salary, Federal and Provincial Governments, 2000-2010 
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Second, many governments experience sharp increases in their cabinet ministers’ salaries. 
For instance, minister salaries in the federal government show a large increase in 2001. To be 
specific, minister salaries in 2001 increased by 70 percent compared to salaries in 2000, 
recording the highest change across all the jurisdictions over the period 2000-2010. Also, all 
provincial governments except Quebec show a sharp increase in their minister salaries in the late 
2000s. In fact, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Nova Scotia bumped up their 
minister salary in 2007, with the increase ranging from 12 percent in Saskatchewan to 45 percent 
in Nova Scotia. Additionally, British Columbia and New Brunswick saw hikes in minister 
salaries in 2009 of 28 percent and 18 percent, respectively. These increases can often be linked to 
specific events. For example, the government of Manitoba approved a 34 percent increase in 
cabinet minister salaries in 2007 based on positive economic conditions and the fact that their 
ministers were being paid less than ministers in other governments (Werier, 2007). Another 
example can be found in the 2007 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) compensation 
review in New Brunswick. The review looked at changes in other provincial governments 
including the government of Ontario. According to the review, the government of Ontario in 
2007 increased minister salaries based on the recommendation of the Integrity Commissioner; 
one of the responsibilities of the commissioner is to review the Member of Provincial 
Parliament’s compensation (New Brunswick, 2007). As a result, the minister salary in 2007 
increased by 36 percent from 2006. 
Third, the ranking of minister salaries also varies over the period of 2000-2010. In 2000, 
Quebec and the federal government were in the group with the highest pay, reporting $117,527 
and $ 112,095 respectively. British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario followed next, with pay 
ranging between approximately $103,000 and $106,000. Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia followed in a lower group, paying their ministers under $100,000. In 
2001, the ministers in the federal government received a large raise (70 percent increase). 
Coupled with a steady increasing rate of minister salary, the federal government records the 
highest paying jurisdiction throughout the time and the pay gap between federal and non-federal 
ministerial salaries remain fairly large. By 2010, this gap is close to $100,000. Between 2006 and 
2007, several governments experience large hikes in minister salary. The minister salary in 
Ontario increases by 35.6 percent, moving its ranking to the Quebec level around $170,000.  
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Figure 4.3. Real Minister Salary, Federal and Provincial Governments, 2000-2010 
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Manitoba and Nova Scotia experience hikes in ministerial salary, moving up from lowest group 
to the midrange group. Hence, the midrange group is rearranged, now consisting of British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia and varying between $130,000 
and $150,000. In 2009, British Columbia increased minister salary and became the leading 
jurisdiction among the midrange group. By 2010, the federal government payed their ministers 
approximately $270,000. Ontario and Quebec stayed in mid to high range, paying salaries of 
approximately $193,000. British Columbia and Alberta follow, with salaries ranging around 
$170,000, followed by Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba. New Brunswick stayed in the 
lowest group recording compensation of $117,000. 
 Lastly, similar to DM salaries, minister salaries are affected by economic events. 
Although it is not easily discernible in Figure 4.3, minister salaries tend to stagnate from time to 
time due to economic conditions. According to the Report of the Commissioner on Salaries, 
Allowances and Retirement, Benefits for Members of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly 
(Werier, 2012), due to economic downturn only the cost of living was reflected in minister salary 
adjustments in 2008 and 2009, with a freeze in MLA salaries implemented in the latter part of 
2009. The result was that after a large increase in 2007, minister salaries grew at 2.3 percent 
increase in 2008 and 0.3 percent increase in 2009. In Ontario, minister salaries were frozen from 
2003 to 2006, only receiving inflation based increases (i.e., 1.9 percent increase in 2005 and 2.2 
percent in 2006) (Ontario, 2006). Figure 4.3 shows almost no change between 2003 and 2006.  
A comparison of DM salaries with cabinet minister salaries can be carried out by 
examining Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2. Two patterns can be observed from the data: (1) the 
relatively modest growth rate of DM salaries compared to a fairly strong growth rate of minister 
salaries; and (2) the tendency of DM and minister salaries to move together in all jurisdictions 
with exception of Alberta. 
On the first point, DM salaries increased over the 2000-1010 period at a much lower rate 
than minister salaries. On average, DM salaries increased 2.85 percent, whereas minister salaries 
increased 6.16 percent. Looking at the different jurisdictions, the average annual growth rate of 
DM salaries is between zero percent and 4 percent range (with exception of New Brunswick 
which reported 6.7 percent). In contrast, the annual growth rate of minister salaries ranges from a 
minimum of 3.69 percent to a maximum of 10.62 percent.  
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 Second, DM and minister salaries appear to have converged by the late 2000s. In all 
jurisdictions, minister salaries are lower than DM salaries in 2000. Due to the higher growth rate 
of minister salaries, the gap between the minister and DM salaries is reduced over time. The 
exception is Alberta, where DM salaries grew sufficiently rapidly to remain above minister 
salaries. For British Columbia and Ontario, the levels of the minister and DM salaries are very 
similar by 2010. For the federal government, Manitoba and Nova Scotia, the minister salaries are 
above DM salaries after 2005.  
Figure 4.5 presents a scatter plot of DM and cabinet minister salaries across all nine 
jurisdictions and over the period 2000-2010. Overall, this figure indicates that there is a positive 
association between DM and minister salaries. Moreover, since the slope of the trend line is less 
than 45 degrees, a dollar change in ministerial salary is associated with less than a dollar change 
in DM salary. Since ministerial salaries on average started out in 2000 being less than DM 
salaries on average, and since there was a growth in ministerial salaries over time, the result is 
that, on average, ministerial salaries were greater than DM salaries in 2010. The one exception of 
this pattern is Alberta, where DM salaries have kept pace with minister salaries. Ontario, British 
Columbia and New Brunswick are clustered above the regression line, implying higher DM 
salaries than is predicted by the regression model. Of course, there are other jurisdictions that 
have DM salaries lower than the regression line – these jurisdictions include the federal 
government, Quebec, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  
4.3.3. DM and Private Sector Counterpart Salaries 
While there seems to be a reasonably strong relationship between DM and minister salaries, this 
is not true of the salaries of DMs and their private sector counterparts. Figure 4.6 presents 
salaries of DMs and ministers, along with the private sector comparator in selected years (2000, 
2005 and 2010). The private comparators are much higher than DM salaries. The highest DM 
salaries in 2000 are in the range of $200,000 to $220,000, which is much lower than the private 
sector comparator, which is close to $380,000; the difference is $160,000-180,000. Moreover, 
the salary gap between DMs and their private-sector counterparts is growing over time. In 2010, 
the median DM salary in Alberta is approximately $280,000 (the highest in Canada), while the 
private counterpart salary is nearly $684,000, a difference of $404,000. The annual growth rate 
 46 
 
of private sector salaries is approximately 6.2 percent, whereas the growth rate for DM salaries is 
close to 3 percent. 
 
Figure 4.4. Real Minister and DM salaries, Federal and Provincial Governments, 2000-2010 
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Table 4.2. Real Salaries of DM and Minister, Federal and Provincial Governments, and Private Comparator and Average Annual 
Growth Rate of Salaries, 2000-2010 
Jurisdiction Year DM Minister 
  Salary Annual Growth Rate (2000-2010) Salary Annual Growth Rate (2000-2010) 
  (2002 $) (%) (2002 $) (%) 
FD 2000 216,979 2000-2005 0.37 112,095 2000-2005 17.69 
2005 221,051 2005-2010 0.84 228,445 2005-2010 3.541.84 
2010 230,343 2000-2010 0.61 271,733 2000-2010 10.62 
BC 2000 133,256 2000-2005 4.82 104,940 2000-2005 2.56 
2005 162,321 2005-2010 2.96 119,091 2005-2010 8.25 
2010 183,510 2000-2010 3.89 173,561 2000-2010 5.40 
AB 2000 213,722 2000-2005 4.46 103,341 2000-2005 4.67 
2005 258,914 2005-2010 2.17 129,748 2005-2010 5.09 
2010 283,467 2000-2010 3.31 165,488 2000-2010 4.88 
SK 2000 128,167 2000-2005 1.06 95,552 2000-2005 4.54 
2005 133,559 2005-2010 5.39 119,219 2005-2010 5.26 
2010 173,100 2000-2010 3.23 153,300 2000-2010 4.90 
MB 2000 128,329 2000-2005 -1.01 84,660 2000-2005 3.92 
2005 120,456 2005-2010 0.42 102,571 2005-2010 9.03 
2010 122,859 2000-2010 -0.30 153,192 2000-2010 6.48 
ON 2000 192,488 2000-2005 -0.44 105,898 2000-2005 4.18 
2005 185,908 2005-2010 1.22 129,788 2005-2010 9.02 
2010 195,920 2000-2010 0.39 193,216 2000-2010 6.60 
QC 2000 135,748 2000-2005 2.83 117,527 2000-2005 6.79 
 2005 155,293 2005-2010 4.73 162,315 2005-2010 3.41 
 2010 193,986 2000-2010 3.78 191,771 2000-2010 5.10 
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Table 4.2. Real Salaries of DM and Minister, Federal and Provincial Governments, and Private Comparator and Average Annual 
Growth Rate of Salaries, 2000-2010 (cont’d) 
Jurisdiction Year DM Minister 
  Salary Annual Growth Rate (2000-2010) Salary Annual Growth Rate (2000-2010) 
  (2002 $) (%) (2002 $) (%) 
NS 2000 102,553 2000-2005 5.23 78,467 2000-2005 4.16 
2005 131,845 2005-2010 2.91 95,863 2005-2010 11.38 
2010 147,648 2000-2010 4.07 156,375 2000-2010 7.77 
NB 2000 102,206 2000-2005 4.80 82,733 2000-2005 1.91 
2005 128,835 2005-2010 8.60 90,680 2005-2010 5.48 
2010 189,312 2000-2010 6.69 117,221 2000-2010 3.69 
 
 
 
Private Sector 
 Salary Annual Growth Rate 
 (2002 $) (%) 
2000 379,709 2000-2005 10.66 
2005 627,271 2005-2010 1.74 
2010 683,853 2000-2010 6.20 
 
 49 
 
 
The gap between DM salaries and their private counterparts is noted in governmental 
discussions. At the federal level, this difference is repeatedly mentions in the reports of the 
Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (Canada 1998; 2000; 2005; 
2010 and 2011). The Committee also noticed that this difference between public sector and 
private salaries becomes wider at higher levels of the civil service (i.e., at the DM level).  
While looking at Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6, this discrepancy between private and public 
salaries can be discussed in terms of DM salary determination process, policy lag and financial 
restraint. To begin with, the federal government uses two steps in setting DM salaries. First, 
compensation for the lowest executive position (that is, EX 01) is set equal to its private 
comparator. Then, the base salary of the next senior position progresses with different job 
responsibilities (Canada, 2000b). However, it is argued that this salary progression does not 
reflect greater job responsibilities, thus creating the compression issue. At the most senior level, 
the compression of the salary is the greatest (Canada, 1998). Therefore, DMs are provided with 
Figure 4.5. Scatter Plot of DM and Minister Salaries, Federal and Provincial Governments, 
2000-2010 
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less compensated compared to their private comparators and with respect to their job 
responsibilities. 
Secondly, the approach to the compensation policy in the public sector is more conservative. 
According to the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, the federal 
government has implemented a “lag policy” in which adjustment of the salary range in the 
current year is based on changes in the private market in the previous year. This conservative 
compensation policy by nature falls behind with salary adjustment in the private sector. The 
seventh report by the Advisory Committee states that its salary recommendation is based on 
private salary data that is at least 15 months old (Canada, 2004). In the same report, the 
Committee recognizes the limitations of this approach: it does not effectively reflect the 
Canadian labour market condition. However, on the opposite side, it means that public sector 
compensation policy is more “prudent” and less affected by the economic conditions. 
 Thirdly, the compensation in the public sector is often influenced by budgetary restraints. 
For example, the federal government froze the base pay during 2011-2013 due to the economic 
downturn. Although the government recognizes that the salary of senior positions is falling 
behind compared to the private sector salary, they also acknowledge that senior officials need to 
be an exemplary of public servants through restraining their salary level. These three aspects of 
compensation policy in the public sector derive from the political nature of the public sector. 
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Figure 4.6. Salaries of DM and Minister, Federal and Provincial Governments, and Private Comparator, 2000-2010 
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4.4. DM Salaries and Pay-for-Performance 
The comparison of DM salaries with their public masters – namely, cabinet ministers – and their 
private counterparts showed two points: first, there is a growing gap between DM salaries and 
private comparator salaries; and second, DM salaries and minister salaries are positively related. 
These two patterns suggest the highly political nature of DM salary determination. DM salaries 
appear to be strongly determined by a desire to hold spending down during tough economic 
times and to have DM salaries more or less in line with the salaries of cabinet ministers, the 
people for whom DMs work. The evidence for the first of these factors is found in the slower 
growth rate of DM salaries during tight fiscal periods, while evidence for the second is found in 
the fact that the growth in minister salaries was not subject to the same degree of dampening 
during tough economic times as DM salaries. 
Although many jurisdictions acknowledge the importance of keeping DM salaries 
competitive with their private counterparts and their public counterparts in other governments, 
this acknowledgement is often muted. According to the report from the Advisory Panel on 
Management and Non-Bargaining Staff Recruitment and Retention (Ontario. 2016), CEOs’ 
objectives are described as less vague and hence more readily determined, and their 
responsibilities often derive from a single source – i.e., profit. In contrast, the objectives of DMs 
are more vague; DMs also have multiple objectives and responsibilities. Therefore, while the 
report points out that private sector salaries should be referenced when considering DM 
compensation, it should not be weighed heavily. The government of British Columbia also 
discusses the need for a cautious approach to private sector salaries. In the 2014 compensation 
review, it is indicated that the government’s compensation philosophy should consider the 
federal and other provincial governments as more important in determining compensation, even 
though private sector salaries are a factor to consider (British Columbia, 2014).  
In addition to the two trends identified above, the data analysis also highlighted a third 
point, namely the growing importance of pay-for-performance schemes, with governments 
across Canada linking DM pay with performance. The introduction of pay-for-performance 
suggests that higher performing DMs might be able to earn a higher salary, thus potentially 
offsetting some of the relative salary decline that DMs as a group have experienced. Given the 
apparent political nature of DM compensation determination described above, the implication is 
that pay-for-performance schemes might be introduced as a part of a new political-economic 
 53 
 
equilibrium that sees DMs subject to more political control in exchange for higher salaries 
(Atkinson, Fulton and Kim 2014).  
To examine this question of higher reward for better performer, Figure 4.7 presents DM 
salaries for jurisdictions that either have or do not have pay-for-performance systems in place 
over the period 2000-2010. As can be seen, there is a substantial difference in the average 
salaries across these two types of jurisdictions. In jurisdictions with pay-for-performance systems, 
the average DM salary is approximately $190,000, whereas DM salaries in jurisdictions without 
a pay-for-performance system are on average $130,000. Figure 4.8 further breaks down DM 
salaries across the two different categories of pay-for-performance systems. DM salaries are 
higher on average in jurisdictions with either passive or aggressive pay-for-performance schemes, 
with the aggressive jurisdictions having the highest DM salaries. To be specific, DM salaries 
with aggressive pay-for-performance schemes are approximately $222,000 on average and DM 
salaries with passive type are around $149,000 on average. Both figures 4.7 and 4.8 suggest the 
implementation of pay-for-performance allows DMs to receive higher salaries on average, with 
the more aggressive form of pay-for-performance generating more pay than the passive form.  
 This evidence is consistent with the political nature of DM compensation determination 
discussed above. Given the close connection between pay-for-performance and NPM movement 
(OECD, 2005), this is also evidence that NPM has a strong political element. As was noted 
earlier, NPM pursues better public management (i.e., increased accountability, improved public 
service quality) through the use of market-like mechanisms such as contracts drawn from the 
private sector. In the public arena, linking performance and pay means governments can set out 
criteria for DMs to address, and then provide bonuses if these criteria are achieved. While each 
jurisdiction has different performance goals and appraisal processes, it is common that 
governments lay out their political agenda. 
 Consider, for instance, the commitments a federal DM agrees to under the performance 
agreement contract with the Clerk of the Privy Council. The individual component of these 
commitments has four criteria that can be achieved through an individual’s leadership, 
management and influence. The corporate commitments include the government’s priorities in 
each year that will be rewarded collectively if they are achieved. The federal government 
attaches different weights to each commitment, with 60 percent of risk pay based on the 
individual commitment appraisal and 40 percent on the corporate commitment (Canada, 2011).  
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Figure 4.8. Average DM Salary over 2000-2010 Period: Types of Pay-for-Performance 
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Figure 4.7. Average DM Salary over 2000-2010 Period: No Pay-for-Performance vs. Pay-for-
Performance 
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4.5. Summary 
This chapter analyzed the pay-for-performance schemes in Canada, as well as DM and cabinet 
minister compensation. Beginning in the late 1980s, pay-for-performance systems have been 
implemented across Canada, and currently all jurisdictions with exception of Manitoba and 
Prince Edward Island have adopted pay-for-performance schemes. As has been the case 
elsewhere in the world, pay-for-performance schemes have been adopted to improve the 
management of the public sector by adopting practices that have been successful in the private 
sector and to attract and retain highly qualitied individuals. However, due to the non-market 
nature of the public sector, implementation of pay-for-performance systems has been challenging.  
In this study, the pay-for-performance systems in Canada are categorized into three types: 
(1) aggressive, (2) passive, and (3) resistant or no pay-for-performance. The federal government, 
British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario have adopted the aggressive type. Saskatchewan, Quebec, 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have adopted the passive type. Manitoba and Prince Edward 
Island have not adopted pay-for-performance schemes. 
Over the period 2000-2010, DM compensation (measure in real terms) across the various 
political jurisdictions has generally increased, although there is considerable year-to-year 
variation, with DM pay declining in some jurisdictions during periods of economic downturn. 
Cabinet minister salaries have also increased over the 2000-2010 period, with the overall growth 
rate higher than for DMs. The slower growth of DM salaries relative to cabinet minister salaries 
means that DM salaries and minister salaries have been converging. DM salaries have also not 
grown as fast as those of their comparators in the private sector, suggesting that DM salaries are 
influenced by factors that give little weight to other economic opportunities and by political 
factors such as the need to appear fiscally prudent during economic downturns and the desire by 
cabinet ministers to be paid at a comparable level to DMs.  
It is argued that the adoption of pay-for-performance schemes needs to be seen in the 
context of a political determination in which governments tie their priority and agenda to the 
DMs’ performance criteria; pay-for-performance then becomes a mechanism for rewarding DMs 
for achieving these goals.  
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CHAPTER 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
5.1. Regression Models 
Chapter 4 examined DM salary in Canada in relation to three variables: cabinet minister salary, 
private comparator salary and pay-for-performance system. A scatter plot of DM salaries versus 
cabinet minister salaries across provinces and time showed a positive relationship between these 
two variables; the slope of the trend line was less than one, suggesting that DM salaries increased 
less rapidly that ministerial salaries over time. A comparison of DM salaries and private sector 
comparator salaries showed no visible pattern between these two variables. A comparison 
between average DM salary across province with and without pay-for-performance schemes 
showed a positive relationship between pay-for-performance and DM compensation.  
The analysis carried out in Chapter 4 is preliminary for two reasons. First, the analysis 
does not consider all three independent variables together. Second, there are other explanatory 
variables that might play a role in DM salary determination and that are correlated to some 
degree with the explanatory variables of interest, namely cabinet minister salary, private 
comparator salary and pay-for-performance system. These other explanatory variables include 
indicators representing labour market condition, political barriers and provincial differences. To 
address these two issues, multiple regression analysis was undertaken. The results of the 
regression analysis are provided below. 
 The regression analysis investigates how DM salaries are influenced by three key 
independent variables (cabinet minister salaries, private comparator salaries and pay-for-
performance systems) while holding other control variables constant. DM salaries, cabinet 
minister salaries and private counterpart salaries are expressed in constant dollar terms. Private 
counterpart salaries are lagged one-year to reflect the fact that public sector pay levels are 
typically based on past values of private sector pay (the regression analysis was also carried out 
using current year values for private sector pay and are included in the appendix A-D). The pay-
for-performance variable is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one when a pay-for-
performance scheme is in place. The analysis also considers a regression with two dummy 
variables for pay-for-performance, one that takes on a value of one when the scheme is passive 
and another that takes on a value of one when the scheme is aggressive. A dummy variable is 
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included for the period after the economic crisis of 2008 (thus this variable takes on a value of 
one for 2009 onward). An interaction variable of the economic crisis and minister salary is 
included to see if ministerial salary has a differential impact on the DM salary level during the 
economic crisis. In addition to the above variables, two different sets of control variables are 
added: economic variables (yearly inflation rate, economic growth rate and GDP per capita) and 
political variables (presence of an election, political party in power and degree of public 
unionization). The variable Election is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one when an 
election was held in that year. The variable Political party in power is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 for conservative/right parties and 0 for left parties. The variable Public 
unionization is calculated as the percentage of public sector workers who are covered by a union.  
 Two sets of regression models are estimated: one without controls and one with controls. 
In each set, the first model is a regression of DM salary on minister salary. The second model 
regresses DM salary on pay-for-performance, while the third model is the first model with 
lagged private sector salary added. The fourth model adds the pay-for-performance variable, 
while the fifth model replaces the simple pay-for-performance variable with variables for passive 
and aggressive types of pay-for-performance. The sixth model adds a dummy variable for the 
economic crisis, while the seventh model adds the interaction variable of economic crisis and 
ministerial salary. 
 The final model in the first set with all the variables added (Model 7) can be written as 
follows:  
𝐷𝑀 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 +  𝛾 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛿 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒
+  𝜃 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝜗 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝜇 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
+  𝜀 
The final model in the second set can be written as follows:  
𝐷𝑀 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 +  𝛾 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛿 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒
+  𝜃 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝜗 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝜇 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
+ 𝜋 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜌 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝜎 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 +  𝜏 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+  𝜑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝜔 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀 
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 The main focus of attention in the examination of the results is what happens to the sign 
and the magnitude of the coefficients on the three independent variables of interest (minister 
salary, private salary and pay-for-performance) as the analysis moves from the first model to the 
last model in each set, as well as what happens to these coefficients when the control variables 
are added (set two versus set one). If the coefficients stay relatively constant across models then 
this provides some evidence that the relationship between DM salary and the variables of interest 
are being accurately captured. 
5.2. Regression Results 
Table 5.1 and 5.2 present the regression results for the two sets of regressions, one without 
control variables and one without. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the same two sets of regressions 
with Alberta excluded. As was shown in the analysis in chapter 4, Alberta is somewhat of an 
outlier from the other jurisdictions. As figure 4.4 showed, DM salary in Alberta remained above 
ministerial salary by a constant amount over the period 2000-2010; in contrast, many of the other 
jurisdictions exhibited a pattern in which the gap between DM salary and ministerial salary 
decreased over time.  
The coefficients marked by asterisks are statistically significant at the 95 percent (*), 99 
percent (**) or 99.9 percent (***) level. The adjusted R2 provides an indication of the 
explanatory power of the variables in each model, with an increase in the adjusted R2 indicating 
that the new variable that is added explains the dependent variable better than random chance. 
The F statistic provides a test of whether the independent variables taken together provide any 
explanatory power compared to an estimate of the mean.  
 Table 5.1 presents the regression results for the analysis without control variables and 
Alberta is included. The estimated coefficient on minister salary is positive and statistically 
significant at the 99.9 percent level in Models 1, 3 and 4; this estimate is not statistically 
significant when the Aggressive and Passive pay-for-performance variables and the economic 
crisis variables are added (e.g., Models 5-7). The estimated coefficient on minister salary 
decreases when the pay-for-performance dummy variable is added in Model 4 (notice the change 
from 0.596 in Model 1 and 0.577 in Model 2 to 0.397 in Model 4) and further decreases when 
the Aggressive and Passive pay-for-performance variables and economic crisis variables are 
added (Model 5,6, and 7). 
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The general pay-for-performance variable and the Aggressive pay-for-performance 
variable are statistically significant at the 99.9 percent level whereas the Passive pay-for-
performance variable is significant at 95 percent (see Models 2 and 4-7). Model 4 indicates that 
the introduction of pay-for-performance increases DM salary by more than $80,000 on average 
(see Models 5-7). The passive type of pay-for-performance is estimated to increase DM salary on 
average by more than $10,000. The lagged private sector pay variable is only statistically 
significant in Models 4 and 5 (95 percent level). The variables associated with the economic 
crisis are not statistically significant. 
Table 5.2 presents the regression results for the analysis with control variables and 
Alberta is included. The estimated coefficients on minister salary are statistically significant 
across all models, contrary to the first set of regressions results (Models 1-7) where they lose this 
significance when pay-for-performance and economic crisis variables are introduced. Models 8, 
10, and 11 indicate a one dollar increase in ministerial salary is associated with an increase in 
DM salary of about 40 cents. In Model 12, the statistical significance of this estimated 
coefficient drops to 95 percent and the magnitude of the coefficients falls to around 20 cents. The 
private sector salary is not statistically significant when the control variables are added. While 
the dummy variable for pay-for-performance is statistically significant in Model 9, it loses this 
significance when included with minister and private salaries (Model 11). The coefficient on 
Aggressive pay-for-performance is statistically significant at the 99.9 percent in Models 12-14, 
the impact on DM salary is roughly $45,000. The Passive pay-for-performance schemes are not 
statistically significant in any of the models; nor are the economic crisis variables. Across all 
models the GDP per capita variable is positive and statistically significant.  
 Table 5.3 provides the regression results for the case where the control variables are 
omitted and Alberta is excluded. The estimated coefficient on minister salary is positive and 
statistically significant at the 99.9 percent level in all models (e.g., Models 15-21). Similar to the 
regression results for all jurisdictions when the control variables are omitted (Table 5.1), the 
estimated coefficient on minister salary decreases when the pay-for-performance dummy 
variable is introduced in Model 18 (notice the change from 0.586 in Model 15 and 0.597 in 
Model 17 to 0.485 in Model 18). The decrease continues when the Aggressive and Passive pay-
for-performance variables and economic crisis variables are added (see 0.236 in Model 19 and 
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0.223 in Model 20). When the interaction variable of economic crisis and minister is added the 
ministerial coefficient increases slightly to 0.266 in Model 21. 
 The general pay-for-performance variable and the Aggressive pay-for-performance 
variable are statistically significant at the 99.9 percent level, whereas the Passive pay-for-
performance variable is significant at 99 percent (see Models 16 and 18-21). Model 18 indicates 
that the introduction of pay-for-performance increases DM salary by approximately $25,000. 
The aggressive type of pay-for-performance increases DM salary by more than $55,000 while 
the passive type is estimated to increase DM salary on average by more than $12,000 (see 
Models 19-21). The lagged private sector pay variable is not statistically significant. The 
economic crisis variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent in Model 21.  
Table 5.4 provides the regression results with the control variables included and the 
observations for Alberta excluded. The estimated coefficients on minister salary are statistically 
significant across all models. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on ministerial salary are 
similar to those when Alberta is included (see Models 8-14 in table 5.2); the magnitudes are also 
similar to the case where Alberta is not included and the control variables are omitted (Models 
15-12 in table 5.3). Models 22, 24, and 25 indicate that a one-dollar increase in minister salary 
results in an increase in DM salary of approximately 40 cents. In Model 26, the ministerial 
coefficient drops to 20 cents. The private sector salary is not statistically significant in any of the 
models.  
 While the dummy variable for pay-for-performance is statistically significant in Model 
23 at the 90 percent, it loses its significance when included with minister and private salaries in 
Model 25. The coefficients on Aggressive pay-for-performance are statistically significant in 
Models 26-28; the impact of this variable on DM salary is approximately $50,000. The Passive 
pay-for-performance schemes are statistically significant at the 95 percent level in Models 26-28 
and the passive type of pay-for-performance is associated with an increase in DM salary of 
$10,000 on average. The economic crisis variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent 
level in Model 28; otherwise it is not statistically significant.  
The focus of the discussion in the next section will be Model 12 and Model 26. There are 
at least three reasons for this focus. First, the models with the control variables included result in 
larger adjusted R2s. Second, the economic crisis variables in Models 13-14 and Models 27-28 are 
not statistically significant and thus do not add anything to the explanatory power of the
  
6
1
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1. Regression Results of DM Salary, No Control Variables, Alberta Included 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Independent        
Minister 0.596***  0.577*** 0.397*** 0.0782 0.0636 0.117 
Lagged Private   0.0163 0.0112 0.0687* 0.0596* 0.0526 
Pay for Performance  59196.7***  40628.3***    
Aggressive     83786.8*** 84210.2*** 83316.5*** 
Passive     15655.8* 15508.3* 13818.9* 
Economic Crisis      7074.3 48017.7 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.245 
Constant 90932.4*** 129323.0*** 84519.6*** 82383.2*** 86016.6*** 91710.3*** 89388.1*** 
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.300 0.294 0.405 0.726 0.725 0.729 
F statistics 42.98 43.01 21.38 23.20 65.83 52.76 44.93 
df_m 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
df_r 97 97 96 95 94 93 92 
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.2. Regression Results of DM Salary, Control Variables, Alberta Included 
Variable  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Independent        
Minister 0.391***  0.417*** 0.393*** 0.188* 0.181* 0.229** 
Lagged Private   -0.0371 -0.0379 -0.0384 -0.0391 -0.0393 
Pay for Performance  19666.5**  6361.2    
Aggressive     45823.9*** 45597.3*** 44206.2*** 
Passive     6743.7 6727.9 5256.4 
Economic Crisis      3655.6 38568.7 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.207 
Control        
Inflation -173.1 84.49 58.24 81.29 671.5* 624.6* 543.1 
Economic Growth -1780.6 -2828.2* -1891.7 -1761.7 -1710.3 -1543.0 -1539.0 
GDP per capita 5.062*** 5.460*** 4.928*** 4.782*** 2.824*** 2.882*** 2.915*** 
Election 1790.6 3858.4 2218.1 2207.4 3561.3 3932.8 2686.8 
Conservative 8256.3 7392.0 7420.0 7207.1 5959.7 6207.2 7941.6 
Unionization -228670.0*** -81712.3 -230801.4*** -217674.0*** -42825.1 -41651.7 -46360.5 
Constant 123037.0* 11454.1 121310.9* 113242.0* 1481.2 3920.9 9324.6 
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.726 0.801 0.801 0.834 0.832 0.835 
F 57.02 38.04 50.21 44.82 50.15 45.26 42.34 
df_m 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 
df_r 91 91 90 89 88 87 86 
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.3. Regression Results of DM Salary, No Control Variables, Alberta Excluded 
Variable  Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Independent        
Minister 0.586***  0.597*** 0.485*** 0.236*** 0.223*** 0.266*** 
Lagged Private   -0.0104 -0.0159 0.0231 0.0151 0.00957 
Pay for Performance  47102.5***  24871.5***    
  Aggressive     59951.0*** 60454.1*** 59802.7*** 
  Passive     14060.4** 13936.2** 12539.7** 
Economic Crisis      6161.2 39646.3* 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.199 
Constant 81704.5*** 129323.0*** 85945.3*** 87117.1*** 92981.6*** 97963.3*** 96052.5*** 
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.337 0.527 0.598 0.802 0.803 0.808 
F statistics 99.73 45.14 49.44 44.11 88.98 71.74 62.15 
df_m 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
df_r 86 86 85 84 83 82 81 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.4. Regression Results of DM Salary, Control Variables, Alberta Excluded 
Variable  Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
Independent        
Minister 0.419***  0.420*** 0.389*** 0.204** 0.188** 0.238** 
Lagged Private   -0.00193 -0.000415 0.00202 0.000881 0.00119 
Pay for Performance  19632.4**  10198.8    
Aggressive     55703.4*** 53860.3*** 51715.8*** 
Passive     12225.1* 12066.1* 10412.5* 
Economic Crisis      9127.3 46554.5* 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.219 
Control        
Inflation -634.0** -466.9 -621.1* -610.9* 137.2 -35.51 -154.6 
Economic Growth -984.9 -2124.7 -995.2 -692.4 -663.6 -257.2 -272.7 
GDP per capita 4.799*** 6.360*** 4.797*** 4.374*** 1.053 1.406 1.546 
Election 2972.6 5667.8 3010.6 2922.9 4596.2 5299.6 3749.5 
Conservative 8916.4* 11490.7* 8885.2* 8119.1 3592.1 4791.5 6932.3 
Unionization -222298.9*** -103279.2 -222484.4*** -198213.9*** 19006.1 14471.0 6162.4 
Constant 171636.8*** 53581.2 171369.7*** 162771.2** 43463.6 53881.0 62019.8 
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.607 0.729 0.737 0.799 0.802 0.809 
F 34.99 20.22 30.24 28.09 35.63 33.11 31.74 
df_m 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 
df_r 80 80 79 78 77 76 75 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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estimated equation. This lack of additional explanatory power is reflected in the lack of any 
major increase in the adjusted R2 from Model 12 to Models 13-14 and from Model 26 to Models 
27-28. In contrast, Model 12 provides a higher adjusted R2 than Models 8-11, while Model 26 
provides a higher adjusted R2 than Models 22-25. Third, the addition of the Aggressive and 
Passive variables instead of the general variable for pay-for-performance (Model 12 versus 
Model 11 and Model 26 versus Model 25) results in a major drop in the magnitude of the 
estimate on the minister variable; along with the statistical significance of the Aggressive pay-
for-performance variable, this suggests a correlation between ministerial pay and Aggressive 
pay-for-performance that would result in a bias of the coefficient on ministerial pay if the 
Aggressive variable were not included. 
5.3. Discussion 
The estimated coefficients on ministerial pay in Model 12 and Model 26 are statistically 
significant at the 95 percent level and 99 percent level, respectively. The positive coefficient 
predicts that an increase in minister salary will lead to an increase in DM salary. More 
specifically, a dollar increase in minister salary can be expected to result in an increase in DM 
salary of 18.8 cents on average (20.4 cents if the results of Model 26 are used). Since this value 
is much less than one, DM salary and minister salary will converge over time, assuming that DM 
salaries are initially above ministerial salaries (which is the case over much of the period under 
examination). The tendency of ministerial salary to rise up toward DM salary is consistent with 
the importance of political considerations when ministers decide on the level of DM salary. The 
conceptual model of DM salary presented in Chapter 2 argued that the cabinet ministers’ 
willingness to pay for DMs is influenced by their own compensation level due to their perception 
of the DM’s job and their concerns about public outrage over government spending. It was 
argued that cabinet ministers regard the DM’s job as similar to theirs and if DMs are to be well-
compensated, then DMs have to be undertaking activities that are beneficial to them as ministers. 
 In addition to this political pull coming from the demand side, the regression results 
provide no evidence that private sector salaries have an influence on DM salaries, since the 
coefficient on the private sector comparator variable is not statistically significant. One reason 
for this result may be a reliance on public sector motivation as an incentive to get people to work 
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as DMs. The model of DM salary points out this motivation, a desire to serve for the public, 
allows for DMs to be less susceptible to the level of their private counterpart’s salary. 
 The estimated coefficients on the Aggressive pay-for-performance variable is statistically 
significant and positive; on average the introduction of an aggressive pay-for-performance 
scheme will increase the DM salary by $45,824 in Model 12 and by $55,703 in Model 26. This 
result suggests that linking pay and performance in the public sector can be viewed as part of a 
political process where principals (i.e., ministers) lay out their political objectives to their agents 
(i.e., DMs) in the hope that DMs’ actions will be aligned with their interests via financial 
rewards. In this interpretation, pay-for-performance schemes can be interpreted as a way of 
implementing a political anchor; while cabinet ministers are willing to pay their DMs more, this 
will only occur if the DMs are working towards goals established by the ministers.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1. Summary 
Since the late 1990s public attention has become more focused on the compensation of 
government officials as a number of provinces, and most notably Ontario, have made the salary 
information of civil servants publicly available. Public sector compensation has also become 
more important for governments since the 1990s due to the aging of senior public sector 
management and the need to hire and retain qualified individuals to fill positions as people retire. 
New Public Management has also brought greater attention to public sector compensation as 
federal and provincial governments have taken steps to improve accountability. 
This greater attention to the compensation of senior public servants has resulted in 
reviews of and changes to compensation policy across Canada. Compensation reviews by the 
federal and some provincial governments acknowledge that senior government officials are paid 
less than their private sector counterparts, with this difference becoming larger at the most senior 
– i.e., DM – level. 
One of the outcomes of these compensation reviews was the introduction of pay-for-
performance systems for DMs. Although pay-for-performance systems were introduced in some 
provinces as early as the 1980s, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the introduction of much 
more aggressive forms of pay-for-performance in which a larger portion of salary is tied to 
performance. Currently, all of the governments in Canada, with the exception of those in 
Manitoba and Prince Edward Island, have a performance pay component. 
In addition to not keeping up with private sector compensation, DM compensation has 
not been as fast as the compensation paid to the DM’s political masters, namely cabinet ministers. 
As the data presented in Chapter 4 showed, the growth rate of DM salaries have been lower than 
the growth rate of the ministerial salaries, with the result that ministerial salaries and DM salaries 
have been converging over time.  
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the factors determining the compensation of 
DMs in the federal and provincial governments in Canada. Of particular interest were ministerial 
salaries, private sector salaries and the nature of the pay-for-performance scheme that is in place. 
In addition, economic growth, GDP per capita, inflation, the 2008 economic crisis, the presence 
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of an election, the political party in power, and the degree of public unionization were examined 
to see if they have an influence on DM salary levels. To address this question, the thesis had 
three specific objectives: (1) to present descriptive data of compensation for senior government 
officials (namely, DMs) in both federal and provincial governments; (2) to examine whether 
political pressure and market force are linked to the compensation of senior public servants; and 
(3) to investigate the impact of pay-for-performance schemes on the compensation of senior 
public servants. 
The thesis started by looking at literature on the executive compensation in the private 
sector since there was little literature on the salary determination of senior government officials. 
The dominant approach to the executive compensation in the private sector is optimal contract 
theory. The theory suggests that a close linkage between pay and performance would effectively 
motivate agents. Alternatively, the managerial power approach argues that executives have 
power to influence their own compensation. While optimal contract theory shows the importance 
of a firm’s profit as a salary determination factor, the managerial power approach sheds light on 
other aspects of salary determination such as managerial power and public outrage.  
Contrary to the executive compensation decision process in the private sector, the salary 
determination process of senior officials is more complex due to the features of the public sector. 
The characteristics are multiple principals, multiple tasks and public service motivation. As well, 
economic and political forces simultaneously influence the salary determination of DMs.  
To provide a conceptual structure in which the factors determining DM compensation 
could be understood, a theoretical model of DM salary determination was developed. In this 
model, DM salary emerges as an equilibrium outcome of supply and demand forces. On the 
supply side, the amount a professional is willing to accept to join the public sector depends on 
the salary paid in the private sector and the degree of public service motivation that the 
professional possesses. On the demand side, the amount a cabinet ministers is willing to pay a 
professional to join the public sector depends on the quality of the services that the professional 
provides, on the cabinet minister’s own compensation level and on the political cost that the 
minister believes will be incurred. 
The price of the professional’s services (i.e., DM salaries) depends on the balance 
between these supply and demand forces. Based on the behaviour that is captured in the model, 
DM salaries are expected to be positively related to private sector salaries, positively related to 
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cabinet minister salaries, positively related to factors that increase the value of the services 
provided by the DM (e.g., economic growth) and negatively related to factors that increase the 
political cost incurred by the minister (e.g., the economic crisis). The model also shows that the 
introduction of pay-for-performance allows ministers to recognize DMs with better performance 
and thus to offer them higher level of compensation.  
After developing a model of DM salary determination, a descriptive analysis of DM 
salary was undertaken. This analysis showed a growing gap between DM salary and private 
sector salaries, while on average the gap between DM salary and ministerial salaries narrowed, 
suggesting that DM salary determination appears to be strongly influenced by political factors. 
The descriptive analysis also showed a positive relationship between DM salary and the presence 
of aggressive pay-for-performance schemes.  
The descriptive analysis, however, only looked at pairwise comparisons of the private 
sector salary, ministerial salary and pay-for-performance with DM salary, and did not consider 
other economic or political factors. To consider these factors together, a regression analysis was 
undertaken. The regression results indicate that private sector salaries have little impact on DM 
salary, and that while DM salaries are positively related to ministerial salaries, the impact is 
relatively small (the estimated coefficient on ministeria l salary is in the range of 0.19 to 0.20, 
which indicates that a dollar increase in ministerial salary increases DM salary by 19-20 cents on 
average). The estimated coefficient on the pay-for-performance variable indicated that DM 
salaries are positively related to the presence of aggressive pay-for-performance schemes. DM 
salaries are also positively related to GDP per capita. 
The regression results from the thesis are not consistent with optimal contracting theory, 
since DM compensation was not linked to either economic performance (GDP per capita) or 
economic growth. Instead, the most important determinants are ministerial pay and the presence 
of an aggressive form of pay-for-performance. The results of the analysis are also not consistent 
with the managerial power hypothesis, since DMs do not appear to have the power to maintain 
their salaries relative to either executives in the private sector or to cabinet ministers. Instead, the 
results require some other theoretical underpinning – one of these possibilities is the political-
economic model developed in the thesis. 
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6.2. Policy Implications 
The regression results are consistent with the view that salary determination for senior civil 
servants is becoming more politicized. The evidence to support this conclusion comes from an 
examination of the DM salary determination process. During the performance appraisal process, 
the performance criteria, in which the political direction is embedded, are set out in advance for 
DMs. The DMs who follow those performance criteria and are able to meet the performance 
targets receive higher level of compensation. Thus, DM compensation is more closely linked to 
this political direction of the government (Atkinson, Fulton and Kim, 2014). The regression 
results are consistent with this characterization of the salary determination process. These results 
show that DM pay is heavily influenced by the presence of pay-for-performance schemes. As 
well, the analysis indicates that in the absence of pay-for-performance, DM salaries and cabinet 
minister salaries are being pulled together. Thus, it appears that political considerations are 
paying a greater role in the compensation paid to DMs. 
 This politicization is contrary to the core idea of the Westminster model of public 
administration. In this model, the public employees are expected to act relatively independently 
from the interests of the government in power and be able to provide advice and implement 
policy without actively participating in the political realm (Aucoin, 2012). This model of 
behaviour seems to be disappearing, as pay-for-performance schemes more tightly link DM 
compensation to the DM’s ability to work within a set of political demands. The implications of 
this politicization are unknown. It is possible that it could result in better public policies – this 
will be the case if cabinet ministers are able to effectively understand the issues facing their 
citizens and direct policy in a manner that addresses these issues. However, poorer public policy 
is possible if cabinet ministers cater to only a small portion of the citizenry (e.g., their core base) 
and/or if they fail to consider all the ramifications of policy choices (e.g., policies that have 
positive short-term political payoffs often have negative long-term economic impacts). Thus, to 
understand fully the implications of this politicization it is necessary to understand better the 
manner in which cabinet ministers make decisions. 
 71 
 
6.3. Limitations and Ideas for Future Research 
This thesis investigated the determination of the DM salary in the federal and provincial 
governments in Canada in terms of political and economic factors and showed that political 
factors are having an influence on DM salaries. As is always the case, this analysis in this thesis 
has a number of limitations. 
 First, the DM salary data collected from the different federal and provincial jurisdictions 
are not standardized. Jurisdictions often use different ways to report the DM salaries. Some 
governments, such as the federal government and the Quebec government, provide salary range 
whereas other governments provide the specific salaries of the individuals that are in place. This 
difference in reporting makes it difficult to compare DM salaries across the various governments. 
Rather than looking at the DM salary across Canada, a case study where one jurisdiction is 
selected could provide a meaningful examination of DM salary determination. 
 Second, the salary data presented in this thesis does not include other components of 
compensation. Pension and non-cash benefits are an important source of compensation for public 
employees and greatly influence their decision to join or leave the public sector (Canada, 2008). 
Therefore, a study on the total compensation package of senior government offic ials would be 
important to understanding public compensation practices, and would enhance the comparison of 
executive compensation practice between the public and private sector.  
 Third, the information on private sector compensation used in the thesis was limited. The 
private comparator salary used in this study was only available for specific years and was 
benchmarked for the federal level. The collection of more comprehensive private sector data (i.e. 
for more years and on a province-by-province basis) could provide a more realistic examination 
of private sector salaries and comparison with DM salaries.  
 Fourth, although a number of control variables were used in the analysis, there may be 
other provincial specific factors, such as cost of living or the state of the provincial budget, 
influencing DM pay that have not been considered.  
Fifth, the examination of politicization needs to be expanded. Future research could look 
more closely on the performance appraisal process to investigate the degree of politicization and 
measurement of politicization. As well, consideration needs to be given to the manner in which 
cabinet ministers make decisions about the policies they decide to support and implement.  
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Appendix A 
Regression Results of DM Salary – No Lag, No Control Variables, Alberta Included 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Independent        
Minister 0.596***  0.584*** 0.403*** 0.0833 0.0668 0.121 
Private   0.0129 0.00744 0.0769* 0.0656 0.0573 
Pay for Performance  59196.7***  40669.9***    
  Aggressive     83790.0*** 84247.6*** 83327.9*** 
  Passive     15777.2* 15601.7* 13882.7* 
Economic Crisis      7699.6 49258.4 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.249 
Constant 90932.4*** 129323.0*** 85126.1** 83421.3*** 78337.7*** 85706.0*** 84283.2*** 
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.300 0.293 0.404 0.724 0.724 0.728 
F Statistics 42.98 43.01 21.32 23.17 65.14 52.34 44.62 
df_m 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
df_r 97 97 96 95 94 93 92 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
  
8
4
 
Appendix B 
Regression Results of DM Salary – No Lag, Control Variables, Alberta Included 
Variable  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Independent        
Minister 0.391***  0.419*** 0.394*** 0.190* 0.183* 0.231** 
Private   -0.0483 -0.0491 -0.0477 -0.0485 -0.0490 
Pay for Performance  19666.5**  6362.9    
  Aggressive     45654.4*** 45424.8*** 44024.8*** 
  Passive     6737.5 6721.0 5241.6 
Economic Crisis      3649.1 38775.3 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.208 
Control        
Inflation -173.1 84.49 69.97 92.13 670.0* 622.3* 541.8 
Economic Growth -1780.6 -2828.2* -1945.8 -1816.1 -1758.9 -1592.3 -1589.4 
GDP per capita 5.062*** 5.460*** 4.928*** 4.783*** 2.839*** 2.897*** 2.930*** 
Election 1790.6 3858.4 2438.2 2429.0 3753.4 4125.8 2877.4 
Conservative 8256.3 7392.0 7438.3 7229.6 6021.4 6272.3 8012.4 
Unionization -228670.0*** -81712.3 -228816.6*** -215643.7*** -41506.9 -40309.2 -45042.6 
Constant 123037.0* 11454.1 126015.1* 118028.2* 6679.8 9204.0 14682.9 
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.726 0.802 0.802 0.834 0.833 0.836 
F statistics 57.02 38.04 50.49 45.07 50.37 45.46 42.55 
df_m 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 
df_r 91 91 90 89 88 87 86 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix C 
Regression Results of DM Salary– No Lag, No Control Variables, Alberta Excluded 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Independent        
Minister 0.586***  0.600*** 0.488*** 0.238*** 0.224*** 0.267*** 
Private   -0.0155 -0.0215 0.0260 0.0167 0.0102 
Pay for Performance  47102.5***  24883.0***    
  Aggressive     59962.1*** 60472.4*** 59803.8*** 
  Passive     14103.5** 13962.1** 12557.2** 
Economic Crisis      6319.0 39908.8* 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.200 
Constant 81704.5*** 129323.0*** 88846.0*** 90568.9*** 90361.4*** 96428.8*** 95248.7*** 
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.337 0.527 0.598 0.801 0.802 0.808 
F Statistics 99.73 45.14 49.52 44.21 88.78 71.66 62.11 
df_m 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
df_r 86 86 85 84 83 82 81 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix D 
Regression Results of DM Salary– No Lag, Control Variables, Alberta Excluded  
Variable  Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
Independent        
Minister 0.419***  0.422*** 0.392*** 0.206** 0.189** 0.239** 
Private   -0.00732 -0.00562 -0.000523 -0.00162 -0.00177 
Pay for Performance  19632.4**  10178.0    
  Aggressive     55674.7*** 53826.0*** 51675.8*** 
  Passive     12212.8* 12054.2* 10398.5* 
Economic Crisis      9140.7 46568.0* 
Economic Crisis * Minister       -0.219 
Control        
Inflation -634.0** -466.9 -594.6* -583.5* 153.1 -21.58 -138.0 
Economic Growth -984.9 -2124.7 -1024.4 -721.1 -677.5 -270.3 -288.2 
GDP per capita 4.799*** 6.360*** 4.795*** 4.373*** 1.053 1.407 1.547 
Election 2972.6 5667.8 3111.4 3021.4 4645.2 5347.9 3806.9 
Conservative 8916.4* 11490.7* 8829.6* 8060.8 3555.9 4762.8 6897.5 
Unionization -222298.9*** -103279.2 -222601.3*** -198455.4*** 18681.8 14188.1 5822.2 
Constant 171636.8*** 53581.2 171585.8*** 162807.3** 43236.1 53827.6 61935.0 
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.607 0.729 0.737 0.799 0.802 0.809 
F statistics 34.99 20.22 30.26 28.10 35.63 33.11 31.74 
df_m 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 
df_r 80 80 79 78 77 76 75 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
